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Knowledge About Welfare: Legal Realism and
the Separation of Law and Economics
Herbert Hovenkampt
I. INTRODUCTION
The modern welfare state could hardly function without
making judgments about how well off or happy its citizens are.
Society's public and even many of its private institutions make
such judgments all the time. Governments devise progressive
income taxes, which are designed to capture more wealth from
those who are well off and less from the impecunious. The ra-
tionale is that taxes do less damage to the welfare of those who
have more to spare. Governments also have explicit "welfare"
programs, designed to provide a minimum standard of living to
persons who are unable to provide such support for themselves
because of disabilities or family circumstances. We have social
security to guarantee our retired and elderly a certain amount
of income. Both public and private colleges provide financial
assistance to less wealthy students.
All of these policies presume an ability to take a manage-
able amount of information about an individual's income or as-
sets and make judgments about her welfare. In fact, politicians
and everyday people do this all the time, mostly without
thinking about the methodological problems involved. Even
adolescents become adept at knowing which of their friends are
well off and which ones are not.
The superficial casualness of our daily observations about
welfare belies the state of the economic science of welfare
measurement. Economists have attempted to measure welfare
scientifically for more than a century, but after an early period
of optimism, the general history of welfare measurement has
not been a happy one. Beginning mainly in the 1930s, many
t Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law and History, University of
Iowa. This paper was presented as the William B. Lockhart lecture at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law School on Oct. 13, 1999.
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economists began to conclude that the scientific measurement
of welfare involved interpersonal comparisons of utilities, and
that we lacked both the observation tools and the measurement
tools to make such comparisons. We lacked the observation
tools because no one can ever experience the mental state of
any person other than him or herself. We lacked the measure-
ment tools because welfare, or utility, apparently does not come
in cardinal units that are capable of being added, multiplied or
divided. I might know that I personally like peach ice cream
more than I like cauliflower, but I have no workable unit of
constant measurement that enables me to tell whether I like it
three times more than cauliflower or only 20% more. And I cer-
tainly cannot answer a question like: Do I like peach ice cream
more than you like cauliflower?
We call our inability to compare our satisfaction with that
of others the "interpersonal comparison of utilities" problem.
The quantification problem we generally refer to as "ordi-
nalism."' Economists responded to both of these limitations by
falling back on the Pareto principle-namely that an action
that affects others can be said to increase welfare if it makes at
least one person better off and no one worse off. Unfortunately,
few state policies ever satisfy the criterion, and no policy that
requires the forcible redistribution of wealth, such as progres-
sive income taxes, subsidized education or welfare programs,
ever satisfies the Pareto criterion. All of them require one
group of society's members to be taxed for the benefit of others,
and thus make one social group worse off.
In the 1950s, welfare economics added to our despair when
Kenneth Arrow developed his famous general impossibility
theory, showing that democratic voting can never produce sta-
ble policies that can be defended as the collective choice of a
democratic society. As a decision-making institution, demo-
cratic voting is generally unable to rank states of affairs ac-
cording to which state contains the greatest amount of welfare.2
1. Ordinalism refers to our inability to make cardinal comparisons of utili-
ties. This concept applies intrapersonally as well as interpersonally if one as-
sumes that people experience declining marginal utility of income. For example,
I might be willing to pay $1,000 for good A and $2,000 for good B, thus revealing
that I place a monetary value on B that is twice as high as A. But if I also have
declining marginal utility of income the first $1,000 out of my pocketbook will be
less valuable to me than the second $1,000. In that case the amount of utility I
obtain from B is more than twice A, but I do not know how much more.
2. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL
VALUE (1951). For an explanation of the problem and a very simplified and non-
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As Richard Craswell has recently described this situation:
[M]ainstream welfare economics does not pretend to offer any theory
of how to justify decisions that affect more than one individual, if
some individuals would gain while others would lose. Unfortunately,
most government decisions do affect more than one person (and there
almost always is both a winner and a loser). By necessity, then,
economists who wish to evaluate most real government decisions have
had to go beyond... mainstream welfare economics by finding some
way to compare gains and losses that are felt by different persons.'
Amartya K. Sen, one of the most prominent active welfare
economists, who won the Nobel Prize in 1998, described the
work of welfare economics as "devastating" for its impact on our
knowledge of welfare.4 Sen then notes that a serious limitation
of modern welfare economics is that it measures welfare exclu-
sively by reference to the competing mental states of a society's
subjects, but he then surmises that welfare might be measured
by other means, or that there might be adequate surrogates for
mental states.5
Indeed, as philosophers since Descartes have pointed out,
any science that requires knowledge about other people's men-
tal states is precarious at best.6 The problem with welfare eco-
nomics is its esoteric assumption that one needs knowledge of
other people's mental states in order to do scientific measure-
ment of the effects of a particular wealth distribution-an as-
sumption which generally stops inquiry in any form of social
science. Much of Sen's own work has been dedicated to recon-
structing welfare economics using "non-utility" information, or
mathematical proof, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow's Theorem: Ordi-
nalism and Republican Government, 75 IOWA L. REV. 949 (1990).
3. Richard Craswell, Incommensurability, Welfare Economics, and the Law,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1419, 1450 (1998); see also Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragma-
tism and the Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2090-93 (1996);
Lee Anne Fennell, Interdependence and Choice in Distributive Justice: The Wel-
fare Conundrum, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 235, 300-20; Cass R. Sunstein, Incommen-
surability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 782-95 (1994); Richard
Warner, Impossible Comparisons and Rational Choice Theory, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1705, 1733 (1995).
4. Amartya Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 349,
351 (1999).
5. See id. at 359.
6. See generally Donald Davidson, Judging interpersonal interests, in
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 195, 203 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hyl-
land eds., 1986) (arguing it is virtually impossible for an actor to have knowledge
about other people's mental states without making observations and comparisons
with the actor's own mental state); John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of
Rational Behaviour, 44 SOC. RES. 623, 644-47 (1977) (discussing weaknesses in
behavior theories based on preference).
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information that does not depend on knowledge about someone
else's state of mind.7
People's mental states are malleable and responsive to
changes in environmental conditions-something we would ex-
pect from any responsive organism. As a result, mental states
adjust to circumstances and the poor may in fact be able to de-
velop a mental state that reflects as much happiness or utility
as the wealthy have. A poor person may derive as much incre-
mental satisfaction from finding $5 on the street as a wealthy
person derives from making $1,000 in the stock market. Be-
cause we can neither compare mental states nor make cardinal
comparisons of amount, we can never know this for sure. But it
is at least as plausible as any assumption that ties mental state
in some permanent and invariant fashion to material wealth.8
If that is so, then even if the measurement of the mental states
of others were possible, it might not be a particularly good way
of assessing welfare.
The American Progressives were the first legal thinkers in
the United States to confront the problem of welfare measure-
ment systematically, and to devise strategies for incorporating
welfare concerns into legal policy. In legal history, the term
"progressivism" refers not merely to the formal progressive
movement, which largely came to an end with the election of
President Harding in 1920, but to a liberal way of thinking
7. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF
LIFE 30 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993); AMARTYA SEN,
COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985); AMARTYA SEN, ON EcONOMIc
INEQUALITY (1997); Amartya Sen, Individual Preference as the Basis of Social
Choice, in 1 SOCIAL CHOICE RE-EXAMINED 15-37 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds.,
1997); cf. Richard A. Epstein, Law and Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloudy
Future, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1167, 1174 (1997) (suggesting "that the language of
'preferences' is inadequate for economics" and that dealing with this inadequacy
should be part of the agenda of law and economics).
8. See Sen, supra note 4, at 358. Sen writes:
A hopeless destitute with much poverty, or a downtrodden laborer
living under exploitative economic arrangements, or a subjugated
housewife in a society with entrenched gender inequality, or a tyran-
nized citizen under brutal authoritarianism, may come to terms with
her deprivation. She may take whatever pleasure she can from small
achievements, and adjust her desire to take not of feasibility (thereby
helping the fulfillment of her adjusted desires). But her success in
such adjustment would not make her deprivation go away. The met-
ric of pleasure or desire may sometimes be quite inadequate in re-
flecting the extent of a person's substantive deprivation.
[Vol. 84:805
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about policy problems that prevailed at least until the 1960s
and even claims some adherents today.
A good signpost for the beginning of Progressive thinking is
1871, the publication date of Charles Darwin's The Descent of
Man,9 which linked the human species to the general theory of
evolution. It is also the publication date of William Stanley
Jevons's The Theory of Political Economy,'0 the first systematic
attempt to apply marginalist analysis to economics.
Dating the end of Progressive legal thought is more diffi-
cult. One good candidate is 1960, the publication date of
Ronald Coase's The Problem of Social Cost,1" the single work
that did more than anything to re-invigorate the law's renewed
interest in the "unregulated" market. But there are alternative
choices: James M. Landis's Report on Regulatory Agencies to the
President-Elect12 has become a symbol of our loss of faith in the
Progressive vision of the regulatory state.13 The work of Ken-
neth Arrow 14 and Buchanan and Tullock 15 did much the same
for political decision-making generally. To one degree or an-
other each of these represents a sharp turn from the essentially
republican vision of government that dominated Progressive
legal thought, to a more classical liberal view emphasizing the
uniqueness and centrality of individual preference, the effi-
9. CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN, AND SELECTION IN RELATION
TO SEX (London, J. Murray 1871).
10. W. STANLEY JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (4th ed.
1911).
11. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
12. JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE
PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960).
13. One must acknowledge some precursors to Landis's pessimism about
government agencies. See MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955); Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of
the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J.
467 (1952); Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process,
67 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1954) [hereinafter Jaffe, Limits]; Louis L. Jaffe, Invec-
tive and Investigation in Administrative Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1201 (1939);
Louis L. Jaffe, The Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administra-
tive Procedure, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 401 (1941); see also HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF
STANDARDS (1962); THOMAS . MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 210, 215,
219-20, 234-35 (1984); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Ad-
ministrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1677-78 (1975). Landis had been
the author in 1938 of the much more optimistic THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
(1938).
14. See ARROW, supra note 2.




ciency and robustness of private markets, and the many imper-
fections of public processes.
Progressive legal thought developed out of the coalescence
of three important ideas: (1) Darwinism in the social sciences,
which was the view that all organisms, including the human
race, are both evolving and struggling to survive in an essen-
tially hostile environment; (2) marginalism in economics, which
stressed that rational people make choices by ranking their
preferences, committing resources to that which they want
most first, and so on; and (3) objective welfare judgments,
which are basically judgments about welfare that do not de-
pend on assumptions about other people's mental states.
Largely as a result of (3), Progressive legal thought was more
republican than liberal in its social theory. Largely as a result
of (1) and (3), Progressive legal thought was never very com-
fortable with mainstream neoclassical economics. Indeed, one
characteristic of Progressive legal thought is that elite legal
thinking became more divorced from mainstream American
economics than at any time in our history. Progressive legal
thought from roughly 1925 to 1960 is characterized by an un-
precedented separation of law and economics. 16 The result was
that while economists became increasingly strict and pessimis-
tic about the science of measuring welfare, Progressive legal
policy was able to lay the foundation for the New Deal, and
later the Great Society-both based on visions about the role of
government that required elaborate and ubiquitous assump-
tions about people's welfare.
To paint with a broad brush, this separation of law and
economics resulted in part from changes in economic theory
that occurred in the 1930s. Up to that time marginalist eco-
nomic theory appeared to justify widespread, state-enforced
wealth distribution and intervention in the market. Then de-
velopments in economic methodology and economists' own per-
ception of the relation between economic science and policy
making cast doubt on this welfare agenda. 17
Progressive legal thought responded to the new economic
theory, not by rejecting its wealth distribution agenda in favor
of more market-oriented policies, but rather, by abandoning the
close historical link that always had existed between legal pol-
16. See discussion infra Part IV.
17. See discussion infra Part IV.
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icy and prevailing economic theory.' 8 After 1930, legal policy
was dominated by legislative concerns about welfare and
wealth distribution, even though economists increasingly re-
garded such concerns as outside the scope of their discipline.
Even policies regarding economic regulation, regulation of
competition, and administration of the common law were
largely divorced from mainstream economic theory.
To be sure, many legal thinkers continued to do economics,
but by and large the economics that dominated both legislative
agendas and legal scholarship was cast off or obsolete theories
that mainstream economists no longer embraced. Just as
mainstream economists were developing the neoclassical theory
of competition, legal policy seemed to assume that markets of-
ten were subject to failure, and that regulatory agencies could
make superior decisions about the allocation of resources. Con-
cerns defined as "economic" often identified equality rather
than efficiency as the appropriate goal. The federal income tax
became increasingly progressive and transferred larger por-
tions of people's income into the public sector.19 Even the com-
mon law incorporated distributive policies that assumed it was
the judge's mandate to level the playing field between the pow-
erful and the impotent.20
18. On this close link prior to the 1930s, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The First
Great Law and Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993, 993-1031 (1990).
19. The highest marginal tax rate rose significantly during World War I, fell
back and began rising during the New Deal until it reached a peak of 94% on in-
comes exceeding $200,000 during World War H. During the post-war forties the
highest marginal rate was around 85%, and during all of the 1950s, it was in the
low nineties (91% under the influential 1954 Code). In 1965, it fell to 70% and
has been falling since. Further, at no time from 1900 until the beginning of
World War H1 were more than 10% of the population made subject to the tax be-
cause the minimum taxable income was so high. During World War II, that
number rose dramatically to 57.1% and has generally increased since then. Of
course, the complete story is far more complicated. First, the total redistribution
effected by the tax depends not only on the highest rate, but also on where the
income gradations appeared, and the percentage of taxpayers that had to pay
each rate. Further, other provisions in the code may have made actual rates
higher or lower than apparent rates. For a summary of the historical data, see
RICHARD GOODE, THE INDivIDuAL INCoME TAX 308 (rev. ed. 1976).
20. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,448-50
(D.C. Cir. 1965); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
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II. THE INTELLECTUAL SOURCES OF PROGRESSIVE
LEGAL THOUGHT
Progressive legal thought originated in the consolidation of
two powerful scientific ideas from the second half of the nine-
teenth century, Darwinism and marginalism. For approxi-
mately two generations Darwinism and marginalism appeared
to unite the biological and human sciences with economics, and
to provide a complete picture of human welfare and social obli-
gation.
This convergence of ideas gave Progressives a complete
theory of human nature, addressing fundamental questions
about individual welfare and incentive on the one hand, and so-
cial relations and obligations on the other. Marginalism pro-
vided a much more rigorous theory of welfare and incentive
than anything that classical political economy had offered.21
Darwinism offered not only a principle of physical development,
but also a theory of community and culture, and suggestions
about the welfare role of the State.
The Progressive intellectual could believe that, through
marginalism, he had discovered a theory of human welfare
based on free choice. The concept of preference orderings, or
declining marginal utility, readily lent itself to mathematical
quantification. 22 But as a result of his Darwinism, the Progres-
sive intellectual could also believe that the same set of welfare
needs applied more or less equally to every member of society.
Darwinian evolution was the great equalizer: in any given en-
vironment those organisms that succeeded in the struggle
against nature tended to have the same characteristics. As a
result, Progressive policymakers tended to believe that by al-
tering the environment or giving its human members the same
set of survival tools, they could increase the chances of success.
Darwinism thus permitted liberal policymakers to generalize
about individual welfare needs without ever making the as-
sumption that economists made that welfare is a function of
mental states. Darwinists measured welfare in terms of sur-
vival characteristics, which largely were external to state of
mind, while economists measured welfare by observing choices.
21. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal
Thought, 46 VAND. L. REV. 305 (1993).
22. See, e.g., F.Y. Edgeworth, The Pure Theory of Taxation III, 7 ECON. J.
550 (1897); F.Y. Edgeworth, The Theory of Distribution, 18 Q.J. ECON. 159 (1904).
On Edgeworth and his influence on incipient law and economics in the United
States, see Hovenkamp, supra note 18, at 1002-03.
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Thus, both Darwinism in biology and marginalism in eco-
nomics helped forge the progressive legal mentality. Darwin-
ism has received most of the attention from historians, 23 how-
ever, while marginalism has until recently been overlooked or
relegated to a secondary position. This is an unjustified imbal-
ance that seriously understates the economic content of the
Progressive legal revolution.24 By underemphasizing the role of
marginalism in Progressive legal thought, historians also un-
derstate the role of economics in the earlier period of legal
thought, which we generally call "classical."25 The principal
concerns of law have always been economic, and much of the
Progressive legal revolution was concerned with improving
economic welfare, and in defining the relative roles of private
markets and state command in the allocation of resources.
A. DARWINIAN EVOLUTION
Evolution by natural selection was Charles Darwin's the-
ory of the development of species. The theory was that nature
produces many more offspring than any particular environ-
mental niche can accommodate; further, one species continually
preys on others. Individuals that by chance inherit character-
istics best suited for survival in their particular environment
tend to pass these characteristics on to their own offspring.
The others die and their less resilient characteristics vanish.
Darwinism had a powerful intellectual influence on emer-
gent social science, 26 and particularly on American legal
23. See, e.g., HENRY STEEL COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND 41 (1950);
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINIsM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 30 (rev. ed.
1955); ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW (1960);
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973); MORTON
WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 104-05
(Viking Press 1949) (1957).
24. One corrective is DOROTHY Ross, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL
SCIENCE (1991). See also Hovenkamp, supra note 18; Hovenkamp, supra note 21.
25. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 9-31 (1992). See generally
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 (1990);
WILLLNI M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (1998).
On the relationship between economics and morals in classical legal thought, see
generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Law and Morals in Classical Legal Thought, 82
IOWAL. REv. 1427 (1997).
26. See generally MARY FURNER, ADVOCACY AND OBJECTIVITY: A CRISIS IN
THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1865-1905 (1975);
ROSS, supra note 24; Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurispru-
dence, 64 TEXAS L. REV. 645 (1985).
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thought. The group of turn-of-the-century Darwinists who be-
came the most prominent were the "Social Darwinists." They
believed that evolution was progressive, in the sense that the
surviving species were physically, mentally, and even morally
superior to those that did not survive. Social Darwinists also
believed that evolutionary progress could run its course only if
the state restrained itself from interfering. State policy de-
signed to provide support for the poor or other inferior mem-
bers of society might be well intended, but its most enduring
consequence was to preserve the lives of those that nature
would have sacrificed. 27 As a result, the evolutionary progress
of humanity was thwarted. Social Darwinists objected to such
legal institutions as progressive income taxation, workers' pro-
tective legislation such as state wage-and-hour laws, or poor
relief. All of these undermined the natural evolutionary proc-
ess.
In the 1950s, historians exaggerated the role of Social
Darwinism and often used the term to describe political and so-
cial views that antedate Darwin and were well established in
the early nineteenth century.28 The real Darwinian revolution
in the sciences lay not in the rather overblown rhetoric of the
Social Darwinists, but in methodological reformulations that
guided the development of modern social science. Most of this
occurred after 1880.29
At the other end of the political spectrum from the Social
Darwinists were the Reform Darwiists, whose distinguishing
belief was that human beings are unique in the evolutionary
process. While all organisms are evolving, only humans are
aware of this fact and in a position to control, or "manage," the
evolutionary process. While Social Darwinists believed in a
minimalist state, Reform Darwinists were statists. They be-
lieved that the state should be actively involved in guiding the
evolutionary process to produce the best individuals possible,
and to improve the lives of those who were not the best.30
27. For the strongest statement of the thesis that Social Darwinism domi-
nated Gilded Age American thought, see HOFSTADTER, supra note 23.
28. See generally ROBERT C. BANNISTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM: SCIENCE AND
MYTH IN ANGLO-AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1979); HOVENKAMP, supra note
25, at 99-101.
29. See ROSS, supra note 24, at 257-302, 390-470.
30. See generally EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS, SOCIAL CONTROL (1901);
LESTER FRANK WARD, DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY (Johnson Reprint Corp. 1968) (1883);
LESTER F. WARD, GLIMPSES OF THE COSMOS (1913). On Reform Darwinism, see
Hovenkamp, supra note 26, at 671-83; see also L.I. BERNARD & JESSIE BERNARD,
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Social Darwinism is often described as a kind of extreme
individualism that believes that all human urges are both self-
ish and unique. As a result, some intellectual historians have
treated Social Darwinism and classical political economy as if
they amounted to the same thing:31 both place a strong value
on individual preference and abhor state interference in mar-
kets.
But classical political economy and Social Darwinism be-
gan from very different starting points. For the classicists,
human preference was both autonomous and highly individual.
By contrast, homogeneity fostered the competition described in
the Social Darwinist model. The struggle for existence among
individuals within the Darwinian paradigm was so intense be-
cause on most fundamental points the individuals who were
competing were alike, not because they were different. Had
they been sufficiently different they could have sought out al-
ternative niches and survived without competing. For Dar-
winists of every kind, human preference was hardly autono-
mous. Rather, preference was nothing more than the instinct
for survival,32 and the evolutionary process guaranteed that
surviving organisms would have similar sets of preferences.
This fact permitted Darwinians to make categorical, or "objec-
tive" judgments about human welfare that economics would
eventually reject as based on unscientific interpersonal com-
parisons of utility.33
B. MARGINALISM
Although Darwinian intellectual ideas were very powerful
at the turn of the century, they were no more powerful than
marginalism, which revolutionized economics during the same
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY: THE SOCIAL SCIENCE MOVEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES (1943); JOHN C. BURNHAM, LESTER FRANK WARD IN AMERICAN
THOUGHT (1956); ROBERT FARIS, CHICAGO SOCIOLOGY, 1920-32 (1967);
HOFSTADTER, supra note 23, at 64-84; JULIUS WEINBERG, EDWARD ALSWORTH
ROSS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF PROGRESSIVISM (1972).
31. See generally COMMAGER, supra note 23.
32. The evolutionary psychologists made this clear. See generally WILLIAM
CHANDLER BAGLEY & STEPHEN S. COLVIN, HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1913); JOHN
DEWEY, HOW WE THINK (1910); WILLIAM MCDOUGALL, AN INTRODUCTION TO
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (8th ed. 1914); MAX FRIEDRICH MEYER, THE FUNDAMENTAL
LAWS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1911); IVAN PETROVICH PAVLOV, CONDITIONED
REFLEXES (1927); JOHN B. WATSON, BEHAVIORISM 6 (1924); JOHN BROADUS
WATSON, PSYCHOLOGY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A BEHAVIORIST (2d ed. 1924);
ALBERT PAUL WEISS, A THEORETICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1925).
33. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 64-84.
20001 815
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
years. Marginalism originated in the writings of the English
utilitarians. By the 1790s Jeremy Bentham already had ex-
amined utilitarianism's economic implications and developed
an embryonic theory of marginal utility. Declining marginal
utility of income and the value of marginal deterrence in crimi-
nal law were both developed in Bentham's Principles or Morals
and his Theory of Legislation.34 Under declining marginal util-
ity of income, although a person experiences increasing per-
sonal value from additional wealth, the rate of increase-that
is, a person's millionth dollar gives considerably less satisfac-
tion than her first dollar did. Under the theory of marginal de-
terrence, the state can limit greater crimes by varying penal-
ties. For example, if theft and murder are both punishable by
death, the robber has little incentive not to kill his victim. But
if theft is punishable by five years in prison and murder by
death, the robber may decide that the former crime is worth the
risk but not the latter.
Marginalism became a coherent movement within eco-
nomic theory in the 1870s. Working separately, Englishman
William Stanley Jevons and Austrian Carl Menger sought to
combine marginal utility theory with classical economics.
Jevons's Theory of Political Economy 35 broke sharply with clas-
sical political economy by disputing the nearly sacred notion
that value depends on the amount of labor that has previously
34. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.LA. Hart eds., 1970) (1789); JEREMY
BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION (Etienne Dumont Hildreth trans.,
1864). Bentham did not come close to developing the theory of marginal cost or
theories of value based on marginalism.
35. WILLIAM S. JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (H. Stanley
Jevons ed., 4th ed. 1911) (1871). Alfred Marshall also deserves part of the credit.
See generally I THE EARLY ECONOMIC WRITINGS OF ALFRED MARSHALL (J.K.
Whitaker ed., 1975). For perspective on the rise of marginalism, see D.E.
MOGGRIDGE, MAYNARD KEYNES: AN ECONOMIST'S BIOGRAPHY 84-86 (1992). In
the United States, John Bates Clark probably came to his marginalism inde-
pendently. See generally JOHN BATES CLARK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF WEALTH 56-
90 (Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1967) (1886); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 870 (1954).
Carl Menger's PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (James Dingwall & Bert Ho-
selitz trans., 1981) (1871) was less influential in the United States than
Jevons's work, since Menger stood outside the British classical tradition.
However, a large group of American graduate students in political economy
who went abroad for graduate study in the late nineteenth century ended up
on the continent, especially in Germany, and many of them studied Menger.
On the influence of German historicism on Progressive Era economics, see
FURNER, supra note 26, at 50-57; ROSS, supra note 30, at 104-05; Hovenkamp,
supra note 18, at 996-97.
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gone into something. Rather, "value depends entirely on util-
ity," which is a purely subjective notion related to the prefer-
ence of the buyer.36 This measure of value might be unrelated
to the amount of previous investment.37 For economics, the
most important contribution of marginal utility theory was its
principle of exchange-that is, the way it explained how mar-
kets work. "[We have only to trace out carefully the natural
laws of the variation of utility, as depending upon the quantity
of commodity in our possession, in order to arrive at a satisfac-
tory theory of exchange."38 A person's willingness to pay de-
pends on the absolute strength of his preferences for the de-
sired good, the amount he already has, and the strength of
preference for what he gives up in exchange. From the eco-
nomic theory of diminishing marginal utility, Jevons also de-
veloped the concept of equal utilities-that a person applying
her money to numerous commodities will purchase an amount
of each up to the point that she derives the same marginal
utility from all.39
For the marginalists, value was entirely subjective, based
on individual preference rather than any property of the de-
sired good itself. As a result, marginalism forced a shift in eco-
nomics' methodology away from the measure of things to the
measure of human behavior. "Value" no longer referred to the
amount of something that was available or the historical cost of
production; rather, it described a kind of behavior and was
measured by marginal willingness to pay. For example, the
great marginalist economist Alfred Marshall knew that the
whole notion of subjective preference meant nothing at all un-
less preference could be measured behaviorally. Thus, one
could speak meaningfully of consumer demand only "as repre-
sented by the schedule of the prices at which he is willing to
buy different amounts of it."40 In the highly influential eighth
edition of his Principles of Economics, Marshall wrote:
If then we wish to compare... physical gratifications, we must do
it not directly, but indirectly by the incentives which they afford to ac-
tion. If the desire to secure either of two pleasures will induce people
36. JEVONS, supra note 35, at 1 (emphasis omitted).
37. See id. at 1-2.
38. Id.
39. "[Wlhen the person remains satisfied with the distribution he has made,
it follows that... an increment of commodity would yield exactly as much utility
in one use as in another." Id. at 59.




in similar circumstances each to do just an hour's extra work, or will
induce men in the same rank of life and with the same means each to
pay a shilling for it; we then may say that those pleasures are equal
for our purposes, because the desires for them are equally strong in-
centives to action for persons under similar conditions.41
This shift in emphasis affected not only economics, but all of
the social sciences generally.
1. Marginalist Explanation
Marginalism seemed to explain many of the puzzles that
had frustrated classical political economy. For example, the
classicists had been hard pressed to explain why people and
firms produce and consume different mixtures of goods, and
why goods appear to have widely different values. Why is wa-
ter cheap, even though it is essential for survival? Why are
diamonds expensive, even though they are non-essential luxu-
ries? More generally, classical political economists had great
difficulty with the concept of cost, and determining the rela-
tionship between the cost of something and its value.42
Marginalism provided a method for answering all these
questions. First, when people place value on goods, only the
marginal value, not the total value and not even the historical
cost, is relevant. Second, people tend to equate utilities over
their entire set of purchasing decisions. Presumptively, every
person's stock of goods is such that her marginal values are all
precisely identical. To the extent they are not, she corrects the
situation by buying whatever has the highest marginal value.43
Third, business firms, whose goal is the maximization of prof-
its, also equate marginal utilities, but these are measured as
marginal expenditures and marginal revenues.44
Within economics, marginalism provided a basis for a gen-
eral theory of consumer demand, of human incentives, a theory
of value, a theory about production and consumption, and a
theory of costs. All of these could be quantified with great ap-
parent mathematical precision. Thanks to marginalism, neo-
41. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 15-16 (8th ed. 1920).
42. See Hovenkamp, supra note 21, at 311.
43. For illustrations, see id. at 311-12.
44. For example, in deciding what inputs to use in making a product, the
firm maximizes its profits by using each input up to a point that its marginal cost
is identical to the marginal cost of every other input. If labor and machinery are
alternative inputs into a product and the current cost of labor is $5 per unit of
value produced while the current cost of machinery is $4, the firm will invest in
more machinery and less labor until the two are equalized. See id. at 313.
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classical economics became more coherent and rigorous than
classicism had ever hoped to be.
Just as Darwinism almost immediately stretched beyond
the biological sciences, so too marginalism reached beyond eco-
nomics. Marginalism promised a theory of individual behavior
and human rationality. It purported to explain both how hu-
man incentives could be controlled, and how human welfare
could be improved. For these reasons marginalism provided an
important intellectual foundation for the Progressive revolution
in legal thought.
2. Marginalism and Markets
By and large, Progressives believed in markets, although
they found markets to be much more fragile than the classicists
had. Marginalist theory initially presented a host of technical
problems for the classical model of competition. The margi-
nalist model of perfect competition required constant costs of
production, fungible products, and no fixed costs. Just at the
time the marginalist model of competition was being developed,
however, industry was going through a revolution character-
ized by significant economies of large scale production, product
differentiation, and high fixed costs. 45 The natural result was a
consensus that the conditions for healthy competition existed
only as the exception rather than the rule. During the period
from roughly 1890 through the New Deal, economists' faith in
market competition to allocate resources appropriately was ex-
traordinarily low. 46 The 1940s then witnessed a renaissance in
neoclassicism, although much more technical and mathemati-
cal than the neoclassicism of the turn of the century.47 Further,
the new neoclassicism incorporated New Deal anomalies such
as product differentiation, monopolistic competition, and imper-
fect competition into the model rather than treating them as
significant departures from the model. As a policy science, this
revitalized neoclassicism was concerned to ensure that markets
were workably competitive even though the conditions for per-
fect competition were not precisely satisfied.48
45. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 296-364.
46. See, e.g., ARTHUR ROBERT BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION (1936);
EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933); J.
MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS (1923).
47. See generally, e.g., PAUL ANTHONY SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1947).
48. See generally, e.g., J.M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competi-
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III. PROGRESSIVE LEGAL THOUGHT AND LEGAL
REALISM
Progressive legal thought was formed from these premises:
(1) human beings are evolving biological creatures just as
other organisms, and their preferences are shaped entirely by
the instinct for survival;
(2) human beings differ from other organisms in that they
are capable of "managing," or steering, the evolutionary process
to suit their purposes;
(3) individuals have needs and desires for goods, but for
any good the intensity diminishes as one has more;
(4) both individuals and business firms "maximize" by
equating the marginal utilities of everything they buy and sell;
(5) markets are far less robust than the classical political
economists had supposed;
(6) the homogeneity among individuals dictated by the
evolutionary process makes it possible to make interpersonal
comparisons of welfare needs;
(7) the state can improve welfare by involving itself in the
process of resource allocation and transfer.
The result of these ideas was a complete and coherent the-
ory of human choice, of business firm behavior, and of public
policy. While Progressive theory took individual preference
into account, it also believed that the evolutionary process pro-
duced substantial homogeneity of preference. Further, because
preference is nothing more than the instinct for survival, its
content can be inferred from study of the evolutionary process
itself. Progressive legal thought was thus individualistic and
liberal in its theory of choice, but collectivist in its theory of
human nature and well-being.
Under neoclassical economic analysis, one cannot rest
judgments about welfare on interpersonal comparisons of car-
dinal (i.e., weighted) utilities. But the Darwinian scheme did
not rest its judgments about welfare on "utility" information at
all. For the Darwinian Progressives a preference is nothing
more than an instinct, and instincts are driven by survival
needs that can be objectively measured. As a result, a decisive
characteristic of Progressive legal thought was its tendency to
make objective rather than preference-based judgments about
tion, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241 (1940). For an attempt to give policy effect to these




welfare. This ultimately entailed a decisive separation between
the "welfare" judgments of Progressive legal thought and the
"welfare" judgments made by neoclassical economics. 49
For Progressive legal thinkers, Darwinism and margi-
nalism made separate but complementary contributions to pol-
icy. Darwinism provided the biological foundations for viewing
human beings as having similar welfare needs so as to compete
for survival in the same environmental niche. Marginalism
provided a mechanism for evaluating individual preferences
that could be quite diverse. Likewise, while Darwinism sup-
plied Progressive legal thought with its intellectual background
and much of its rhetoric, marginalism provided more technical
and concrete premises for making policy.
The coalition of Darwinism and marginalism also justified
the Progressive commitment to a "mixed" economy, or one in
which resources are allocated by a combination of private mar-
kets and state command. Insofar as survival was concerned,
the state had a prominent role to play; but insofar as there was
a surplus, its disposition was best left to individual choice. As a
result, while Progressive legal thinkers were often quite pater-
nalistic about perceived survival needs, their ideas about the
State nevertheless left substantial room for individual auton-
omy. The state intervened to the point of providing a standard
of living capable of sustaining survival and productivity; the es-
sentially unregulated market then managed the surplus.
Progressives believed that government regulation was jus-
tified on two quite different grounds. First, it could correct
market failures and restore economic efficiency. Because Pro-
gressives tended to believe that markets were fragile, they
tended to find more market failures requiring regulatory inter-
vention. Second, their view of the state's redistributive role en-
tailed that regulation should be used to level the playing field
or aid the economically disadvantaged even at the expense of
losses in efficiency as measured by neoclassical criteria.
The result often was a regulatory regime that served si-
multaneously to serve efficiency and distributive goals, that
was not always careful to distinguish the two, and that was
frequently naive about the political vulnerability of the regula-
tory process. It was no wonder that post-Progressive critics
found the Progressive regulatory institutions such fragile tar-
gets.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 62-84.
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A. THE IMPACT OF MARGINALISM ON PROGRESSIVE LEGAL
THOUGHT
Marginalism refocused Progressive legal thought in four
ways. First, as Darwinians, Progressives believed that human
beings shared most of their welfare needs in common. For that
reason, one could legitimately speak of a transfer of wealth
from the rich to the poor as increasing welfare. For the
wealthy, the final dollar would be stuffed into a bank account
or used only for luxuries, while the impoverished would use it
to purchase food or shelter. Markets do not systematically
transfer wealth: exchanges are made only if both participants
believe they will be wealthier (with wealth measured by prefer-
ence) after the exchange has occurred. Progressives developed
a relatively broad based theory of wealth distribution that re-
quired sovereign intervention in the market. Consistent with
this theory the Progressives favored not only more progressive
tax structures, 50 but also workers' compensation laws that
would automatically give pensions to those disabled by on-the-
job injuries; minimum wage and maximum hour legislation;
and legislation encouraging the formation and activities of la-
bor unions. During the heyday of Progressive law and eco-
nomics, roughly from 1890 to 1920, this view was also consis-
tent with the prevailing economics. In the 1930s, mainstream
economics abandoned its belief in interpersonal utility com-
parisons, however, and the legal and economic conceptions of
"welfare" began to diverge sharply.
Second, marginalism in economics, coupled with Darwin-
ism in the social sciences, contributed to a broad redefinition of
American policies respecting crime, mental handicap and race,
emphasizing marginal deterrence and productivity. Holmes's
new presentation of the common law as concerned with the me-
tering of sanctions did substantially the same thing for common
law rules and remedies. 51 For example, the purpose of the law
of contract damages was nothing more than to give people an
incentive to perform contracts, and to enable them to meter the
penalty costs of breaching against the gains.52
50. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 18, at 1002-05; Edwin R.A. Seligman,
Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice, PUBLICATION AM. ECON. ASS N,
Jan.-Mar. 1894, at 1, 132-33.
51. See Hovenkamp, supra note 21, at 335-45; see also infra notes 56-61 and
accompanying text.




Third, marginalism ended the commitment of American
economists to the wage-fund doctrine, which held that there
was an "iron law" regarding wage rates, and that to force em-
ployers to pay more was to invite disaster for the very workers
that the legislated increase was designed to protect.53 Rather,
wages were thought to be based on the marginal contribution
that a worker made to the production process. An employer
would not hire a worker who did not make this contribution.
As a result, reasonable minimum wage laws would have little
harmful effect except perhaps to reduce employment slightly by
making labor less attractive at the margin of production. 54
Fourth, economic marginalism enabled a wholesale revi-
sion of corporate law, particularly corporate finance, in which
valuation of corporations and their stock was predicated on an-
ticipated profitability rather than historical investment. This
revolution was so complete that corporate finance theory of the
1920s barely resembled the theory of the 1880s. For example,
classical corporate finance theory estimated the value of corpo-
rate shares by asking how much capital historically had been
paid into the firm. By contrast, the neoclassical theory of cor-
porate finance understood that the value of shares depended on
anticipated profitability rather than historical capitalization. 55
B. "INEOCLASSICAL" LEGAL THOUGHT
Not all of legal classicism's critics can be classified as Pro-
gressives. The best counter-example is Holmes, who was just
as Darwinian and marginalist as the Progressives. 56 The mar-
ginalist and Darwinian revolutions produced conservatives who
were nearly as anti-statist and pro-market as the classicists
that preceded them.
53. On the wage-fund doctrine in the United States, see HOVENKAMP, supra
note 25, at 193-98.
54. That is, assuming that the marginal productivity of labor declines, the
employer paying $1.00 per hour would continue to hire workers as long as the
last worker hired contributed $1.00 or more; but if constrained to pay $1.10 per
hour, the employer would stop hiring additional workers at the point that the
marginal contribution was $1.10 The employer might simply produce less, or
might make a somewhat larger investment in machinery or other alternatives to
labor.
55. See Hovenkamp, supra note 21, at 346-58.
56. See E. Donald Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal Process as Artificial
Intelligence, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 140 (1984); Hovenkamp, supra note 26, at
656-64; Hovenkamp, supra note 21, at 335-45.
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Marginalism was not only a theory of human welfare and
value; it was also a theory of incentives. Neoclassicists empha-
sized the latter. They were deeply skeptical about the Progres-
sive commitment to use the state to readjust human fortunes.
Neoclassical marginalism emphasized deterrence rather than
distribution, and focused on the State's role in altering incen-
tives by rewarding or penalizing conduct. Holmes took a dis-
tinctly marginalist position when he argued that a penalty for
breaching a contract is nothing more than the price of the
breach. The same principal explained tort law: we continually
compare the cost of taking precautions with the costs of antici-
pated losses that more careful behavior might have prevented.
In his 1881 lectures on The Common Law, Holmes completely
rewrote the law's system of individual incentives along margi-
nalist lines, but throughout his life he remained extraordinarily
skeptical about state programs designed to improve the lives of
the poor and laboring classes.
The second important distinction between Progressive and
neoclassical legal thinkers was the differing amounts of faith or
distrust that each group placed in the market, and the corre-
sponding distrust or faith that each placed in government
regulation. Progressives doubted the efficacy of markets as no
group of American legal thinkers ever had. During their life-
times they witnessed technological innovations and a mania for
business combinations that appeared to them to transform
American industry from one of hundreds of competitive produc-
ers to tight oligopolies of a few giant firms. 57 They also wit-
nessed the dramatic rise of the family fortunes of the masters
of this new wealth, such as the Goulds and the Rockefellers,
just as they saw the equally dramatic rise of large scale urban
poverty. All of this threatened to undermine the Jeffersonian
and later Jacksonian vision of a society where anyone who
wished could become an entrepreneur.
For the Progressives, the market was at fault on both
counts. First, it produced noncompetitive structures. Second,
it transferred wealth, although in the wrong direction-to those
who already had a great deal, and away from those who were
already impoverished. 58 One of the most lasting and controver-
sial contributions of Progressive legal thinkers was their dis-
57. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 241-307.
58. This was the central thesis of Progressive economist Richard T. Ely's




trust of the market, and their faith that the government
agency, whose salaried officials did not profit from their deci-
sions, could regulate the economy better than private self-
interested market participants. In two stages, first during the
Progressive Era and later during the New Deal, Progressive
policymakers erected the modern administrative state, which
substituted government control for market bargaining in many
areas of the economy.
Beginning around 1960, much of this faith was shattered
when policymakers began to appreciate that regulatory agen-
cies were often captured by the very firms that they were sup-
posed to regulate, and that they were costly to operate and of-
ten prone to error, even under the best of circumstances.5 9
Political scientists and others working in related disciplines be-
gan to emphasize the power of special interests, other serious
imperfections in the political process, and the inability of ma-
jority voting to produce stable results that could be said to
maximize the social welfare. 60 Coase's work6' was widely in-
terpreted as indicating the superiority of private markets over
state command as a resource allocation device. For Progressive
legal thought, that was the beginning of the end.
IV. THE SEPARATION OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
By contrast to Progressive legal thinkers, neoclassical
economists wished to rehabilitate classicism's free market
rather than jettison it. They never gave up the classical belief
that the essentially unregulated market should be the domi-
nant mechanism for ordering property rights and exchange in
the United States. The neoclassical revolution in economics,
which initially found many reasons to distrust the market,
gradually reconstructed a theoretical model in which most
markets appeared to function quite well. From that point mar-
ginalism's theory of incentives seemed only to strengthen the
case for letting the market, rather than state policy, determine
individual wealth.6 2 The "ordinalist" revolution of the 1930s
59. See MCCRAW, supra note 13, at 153-221. See generally LANDIS, supra
note 12; Jaffe, Limits, supra note 13.
60. See generally ARROW, supra note 2; BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note
15. On public choice and social choice theory, see generally DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991);
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989).
61. See generally, e.g., Coase, supra note 11.
62. See George Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J.
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completely undermined the Progressive theory of social welfare,
while leaving the theory of individual incentives largely in-
tact.63 The former required interpersonal utility comparisons
while the latter did not. After the 1930s marginalism was
thought to apply to the range of decisions facing the individual
economic actor, but to say nothing about the welfare conse-
quences of state-imposed redistribution. Neoclassical econom-
ics then moved back to the political right, to a much stronger
commitment to the free market.
Progressive legal thought responded, not by returning to
American law's previous commitment to markets and state
non-intervention, but rather, by abandoning mainstream neo-
classical economics as an important source of its perspective on
welfare and markets. This Part traces these developments.
A. THE "SOcIAL VALUE" DISPUTE
Marginalist economics at the turn of the twentieth century
maintained a "social" conception of economic value. Certain
commodities or opportunities were thought to have a value to
the group that was different than the sums of the values that
individuals asserted in the marketplace. Those who believed in
"social" value believed that the concept of value was meaning-
less unless it was used to describe groups rather than individu-
als. The main reason this was true was that in markets of
competing buyers and sellers the price of a good depended not
merely on individual willingness to pay in the abstract, but on
the amount of competition in production and the amount of
competition in demand. Even relatively orthodox marginalists
such as John Bates Clark believed that economic value was a
social rather than individual concept.64 Progressives generally
believed that this social conception was implicit in margi-
nalism, and that it separated their approach to economics from
the work of the classicists in the first half of the nineteenth
century.
POL. ECON. 1, 14-17 (1957). For a rather extreme statement, see Richard A. Ep-
stein, Hayekian Socialism, 58 MD. L. REV. 271 (1999).
63. See infra notes 129-37 and accompanying text (discussing ordinalism and
progressive welfare economics).
64. See JOHN BATES CLARK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF WEALTH 10-20, 37, 61-63
(1887). In comparison, see the thought of British institutionalist economist John
A. Hobson in EcONOMICS OF DISTRIBUTION (1900) and EcoNoMIcs AND ETHIcs:
A STUDY IN SOCIAL VALUES (1929).
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A neoclassicist in the post-New Deal era might view the
Progressive theory of social value as an unusually expansive
theory of public goods, or goods that will not be produced in the
correct amount if all production is left to individual market
choice. But the theory of public goods does not capture the
Progressive conception of social value. Even under public goods
theory, value must be measured from the perspective of indi-
vidual choice, a proposition that many Progressives rejected.
Columbia University's E.R.A. Seligman, a leading Progres-
sive proponent of law and economics, 65 argued in 1901 that
marginalist economics demonstrated that all values are so-
cial.6 6 Classical political economy had generally tied value to
the cost of production, which had no social component. 67 Mar-
ginalism, by contrast, located value in marginal willingness to
pay, where value became dictated not only by how much the
buyer was willing to pay, but by how much the buyer's competi-
tors would have been willing to pay as well.6 8 For example, in
an auction market a bidder willing to pay $100 might be able to
purchase the good for $10 if no one bid against him. But if the
second highest bidder had been willing to pay $90, then the
winning bidder would end up paying some price between $90
and $100. "Value" was determined not merely by the winning
bidder's preference, but by the joint preferences of market par-
ticipants. In sum, transactions occur only when a seller re-
gards a particular buyer's offer as better than anyone else's of-
65. On Seligman's work on the theory of taxation and the progressive income
tax, see Hovenkamp, supra note 18, at 1002-09.
66. See Edwin RA. Seligman, Social Elements in the Theory of Value, 15 Q.J.
ECON. 321, 322-27 (1901); see also IRVING FISHER, MATHEMATICAL INVESTIGA-
TIONS IN THE THEORY OF VALUE AND PRICES 89 (1965 ed.) (1892); SIMON PATTEN,
ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC THEORY 192 (R. Tugwell ed., 1924); John H. Gray, Econom-
ics and the Law, 5 AM. ECON. REV. 3, 20-23 (Supp. 1915) (arguing that policy eco-
nomics should be concerned with group needs rather than individual prefer-
ences); D.I. Green, Value and Its Measurement, 7 YALE REV. 383 (1899); cf
Sidney Sherwood, The Philosophical Basis of Economics, A Word to the Sociolo-
gists, 10 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 206, 207 (1897) (arguing that the
sociologists' theory of value, as presently developed, was too imprecise to be used
by economists). For a recap of the debate, see Jacob Viner, The Utility Concept in
Value Theory and Its Critics: II. The Utility Concept in Welfare Economics, 33 J.
POL. ECON. 638 (1925).
67. Indeed, its lack of a social component caused some diehard classicists to
continue to defend classical theories of value against the marginalist onslaught.
See generally Silas M. Macvane, Analysis of Cost of Production, 1 Q.J. ECON. 481,
483 (1887); Silas M. Macvane, Marginal Utility and Value, 7 Q.J. ECON. 255
(1893).
68. See Seligman, supra note 66, at 322-23.
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fer, and the buyer regards the seller's offer as better than that
of other sellers.
For Progressives such as Seligman, the value determina-
tion process was social in a second important sense, as well.
The individual utility curve itself was thought to be a product
of socialization. Each buyer determines his or her own willing-
ness to pay by comparing the willingness to pay of other indi-
viduals. This point was practically regarded as a truism that
flowed from the Progressives' commitment to the theory of
evolution. Since human beings are all of the same species and
occupy similar environmental niches, basic elements in the
utility curve are common to the entire class. Further, these ba-
sic elements were more important than more marginal ele-
ments, because the basic elements were more directly related to
survival.
For example, Seligman justified the Progressive income tax
by dividing goods into necessities, comforts, and luxuries. A
progressive tax scheme that taxed away one person's luxuries
to procure another's necessities increased social welfare. 69
Thorstein Veblen believed scarce goods such as penicillin
should be thought of as having a social value that was quite dif-
ferent than any sum of individual values placed on it by those
who needed it.7 0 If human utility curves reflect the instinct for
survival but wealth is maldistributed, then in an unregulated
market the wealthier people's non-survival wants are satisfied
before the poorer person's survival wants are. To say that
penicillin has a social value greater than the sum of individual
values was merely to say that the state should see to it that
enough was produced to satisfy everyone's survival needs, not
merely the amount that a market of willing buyers would pur-
chase. Finally, if human utility curves are a product of the
evolutionary process and reducible to the instinct for survival,
then sociology and psychology can contribute to economics by
studying the source and nature of preference.7'
69. See Edwin R.A. Seligman, The Theory of Progressive Taxation,
PUBLICATION AM. ECON. ASSN, Jan. 1893, at 52; Seligman, supra note 50, at 132-
33. For fuller discussion, see Hovenkamp, supra note 18, at 1002-05.
70. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, Industrial and Pecuniary Employments, in THE
PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILIZATION AND OTHER ESSAYS 298, 307-11
(1919).
71. See, e.g., Walton Hamilton, The Institutional Approach to Economic The-
ory, 9 AM. ECON. REV. 309, 316 (Supp. 1919) (arguing for a "theory of motives ...
in harmony with the conclusions of modern social psychology"); Wesley C.
Mitchell, Human Behavior and Economics: A Survey of Recent Literature, 29 Q.J.
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The concept of a "social" value rested on the premise that
interpersonal comparisons of utility were possible and even
conventional within economics. Indeed, interpersonal utility
comparisons were hardly foreign to neoclassical economics, and
dominant figures such as Marshall and Pigou in England,
Clark, Taussig, Patten, and even Chicago's Jacob Viner en-
gaged in them through the 1920s.72 Clark's son, John Maurice
Clark, argued that a complete economics would include both
the "science" of observing. preferences and developing mathe-
matically the consequences of marginal utility theory; but also
the "art" of examining the social sources of preference. 73 For
Clark, this entailed the use of more objective welfare tests,
drawn from behavioral psychology or sociology. 74 Princeton's
ECON. 1, 2 (1914) (criticizing the view that economic theory rests "upon the sim-
ple facts of preference or choice, and the psychological explanation of these pref-
erences or choices is ... a matter of indifference to our science"); Wesley C.
Mitchell, The Rationality of Economic Activity I, 18 J. POL. ECON. 97, 103, 109-13
(1910) (taking issue with the economist's supposition of the rationality of human
action and arguing that psychology and sociology suggested the contrary).
72. See MARSHALL, supra note 41, at 18-19 (arguing that a pound's worth of
satisfaction to an ordinary poor man is a much greater thing than a pound's
worth of satisfaction to an ordinary rich man); ARTHUR C. PIGOU, ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE 89 (4th ed. 1960) (arguing that "[any transference of income from a
relatively rich man to a relatively poor man of similar temperament, since it en-
ables more intense wants to be satisfied at the expense of less intense wants,
must increase the aggregate sum of satisfaction"); FRANK WILLIAM TAussIG,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 132 (3d ed. 1921) ("The principle of diminishing util-
ity, if applied unflinchingly, leads to the conclusion that inequality of incomes
brings a less sum of human well-being than equality of incomes, and that the
greater the inequality, the less the approach to the maximum."); John Bates
Clark, The Ultimate Standard of Value, 1 YALE REV. 258 (1893) (arguing that so-
cial welfare is a function of aggregated individual utilities); Simon N. Patten, The
Scope of Political Economy, 2 YALE REV. 264, 266 (1894) (arguing that homoge-
neity of wealth and property tends to increase total utility); Viner, supra note 66,
at 644 (1925) ("Changes in the relative distribution of income as between differ-
ent classes will bring about changes in the amount of welfare, even though the
aggregate real income of the community remains the same.").
73. See generally John Maurice Clark, Economic Theory in an Era of Social
Readjustment, 9 AM. ECON. REV. 280 (Supp. 1919); John Maurice Clark, Econom-
ics and Modern Psychology, 26 J. POL. ECON. 1, 7 (1918) [hereinafter Clark, Eco-
nomics and Modern Psychology].
74. See John Maurice Clark, The Concept of Value: A Rejoinder, 29 Q.J.
ECON. 709, 712 (1915); see also Clark, Economics and Modern Psychology, supra
note 73, at 10 ("In proportion as scientific research progresses, minimum stan-
dards of welfare will become more and more matters of social knowledge and less
and less matters of individual taste-but only minimum standards relating to
those necessities which are generally accepted as such."); Lawrence K_ Frank,
The Emancipation of Economics, 14 AM. ECON. REV. 17 (1924); A.J. Snow, Psy-
chology in Economic Theory, 32 J. POL. ECON. 487 (1924).
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Frank Fetter argued that economists should distinguish "price
economics" from "welfare economics"-the former based on
subjective individual market choice, the latter based on objec-
tive standards of value drawn from observations of group be-
havior 5 Yale's Irving Fisher believed that by using statistics
and empirical data one could construct averaged utility curves
for earners of different income levels, thus permitting policy-
makers to construct an optimal progressive income tax.76
Wesley Mitchell likewise argued that while social welfare was a
"rather vague" concept, it was nonetheless "capable of being
made objective and definite in reference to such matters as
food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, education, fatigue, leisure."77
The concept of social value promised to unify neoclassical
economics with the other sciences. Simon Patten, an economist
who wrote about sociology, believed that the key to under-
standing economics was consumption, and that consumption
patterns are socially conditioned. As a result, sociology and
economics should become a single science. 78
Edward A. Ross, a sociologist who also wrote about margi-
nalist economics, stressed that value is entirely a function of
social conditioning. Social Control, his most important contri-
bution to sociology, was an extended argument that values are
socially formed, that individual selfishness is in constant ten-
sion with social institutions, and that the principal task of soci-
ology is to study the tension between individual instincts and
social conditioning.7 9 At the same time, however, Ross realized
that "value" was ultimately an individual assertion of prefer-
ence. He concluded that social value occurs because influential
individuals place a value on something, and the rest of society
then copies them.80 Further, social values are a product of the
75. See Frank A. Fetter, Price Economics Versus Welfare Economics, 10 AMi.
ECON. Rav. 467,476-79 (1920).
76. See Irving Fisher, A Statistical Method for Measuring "Marginal Utility"
and Testing the Justice of a Progressive Income Tax, in ECONOMIC ESSAYS
CONTRIBUTED IN HONOR OF JOHN BATES CLARK 157, 171 (H. Hollander ed.,
1927).
77. Jacob Wesley Clair Mitchell, The Prospects of Economics, in THE TREND
OF ECONOMICS 1, 31 (Rexford Guy Tugwell ed., 1924).
78. See Simon N. Patten, The Effect of the Consumption of Wealth on the
Economic Welfare of Society, in SCIENCE ECONOMIC DISCUSSION 123 (Henry C.
Adams ed., 1886); Simon N. Patten, The Failure of Biologic Sociology, 4 ANNALS
AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 919 (1894); Simon N. Patten, The Relation of Eco-
nomics to Sociology, 5 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 577 (1895).
79. ROSS, supra note 30.
80. See id. at 329.
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evolutionary process, as are all physical and cultural charac-
teristics of humanity. Social values that fail are forgotten,
while those that seem to enrich their societies or make them
safer are copied and become more firmly entrenched in social
mores, eventually rising to the status of national moral or re-
ligious values. 81 For example, over-aggressive sexuality never
acquires a high social value because, notwithstanding that
many individuals desire it intensely, it leads to social disrup-
tion.8 2 "[Tihe valuations we are bred to are not native to us,' 8 3
Ross wrote. He then located "the genesis of ethical elements"
in the twin evolutionary processes of "selection and survival."84
In sum, our habits, practices and even our desires are the
product of evolutionary process as much as our physical charac-
teristics.
1. Social Value and Human Capital
These views about the nature of value anticipated the eco-
nomic concept of "human capital," which views the human util-
ity function as a kind of production function. 85 If we look at
human beings principally as producers rather than consumers,
then we can make more categorical social judgments about
value. Just as aluminum plants need labor, electricity and
bauxite in a certain combination to operate, so too human be-
ings need shelter, food and education. Indeed, if we begin with
the premise that all human production "plants" are more or
81. See id. at 330.
82. See id. at 331.
83. Id. at 332.
84. Id. at 338-39. Ross illustrated:
There were many styles of gold-washing on the Sacramento in 1849;
but one style was gradually found to be more convenient than the
others, and became after a while the standard way of washing out
gold, which newcomers adopted as a matter of course. A like weeding
out of inferior individual practices brings to light a standard form of
pot or tool or weapon, a standard mode of tilling or breeding, a stan-
dard sex relation or education of the young, which is uniform for all,
possesses authority, and may be termed a culture element....
Once an element has emerged triumphant from this rivalry, it be-
comes fixed in custom and remains thus shielded from competition,
until, perhaps, it is confronted with a different practice or belief that
has won the favor of some other group. Then deadly comparisons are
made, and weeding out begins again.
Id.
85. See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN
BEHAVIOR (1976); GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (3d ed. 1993); GARY S.
BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (rev. ed. 1991).
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less the same, then we can determine objectively the optimum
mixture of inputs that would lead them to perform efficiently.8 6
Furthermore, the theory of human capital measures value
by using the willingness of others to pay as a surrogate for one's
own willingness to pay. That is to say, human capital defines
the satisfaction of individual wants in terms of the impact that
goods have on an that individual's productivity. But the value
of production is entirely a function of the potential buyers'
willingness to pay. So when we measure the utility that A re-
ceives from a weekly gallon of milk by noting that it improves
his productivity by $5 per week, we in effect are observing that
when A receives a weekly gallon of milk others are willing to
pay $5 per week more for A's output. This approach forms a
kind of bridge over the problem of the interpersonal noncompa-
rability of utilities.
The Progressive conception of social value and the human
capital thesis have in common that, while they do not disregard
the role of individual preference in welfare, they use surrogates
for estimating the content of preference. The starting point for
the surrogate is the idea that the neoclassical utility function is
nothing more than the evolving organism's instinct for survival,
which is in itself a kind of production function: the organism
produces what it needs to survive. Further, as evolving organ-
isms developing in similar environments, human beings' sur-
vival needs are similar. Finally, the "instinct" for survival en-
tails that survival needs rank higher in any preference
ordering than do secondary preferences, or decisions about how
to allocate one's surplus. Human capital accounts for this con-
cept in terms that are more familiar to the economist by taking
advantage of the neoclassical literature on the business firm,
which views productivity as the analogue of preference, and
profit-maximization as the analogue of utility maximization.87
As a result, productivity, unlike utility, can be quantified and
compared by the external observer.
The damning neoclassical critique of interpersonal utility
comparisons chose not to regard this point as relevant.8 8 By
86. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89
Nw. U. L. REV. 4,84-90 (1994).
87. See id.
88. See, e.g., LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE (2d ed. 1935); see also Robert Cooter & Peter Rappoport,
Were the Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare Economics?, 22 J. ECON. LIT. 507
(1984); Hovenkamp, supra note 18, at 1033-47.
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separating the utility function from its evolutionary origin and
divorcing utility from productivity, the ordinalist economists
viewed individuals' utility functions as if they had no more
than random relationships with one another. Utility became
nothing more than states of mind about desires. In that case,
the noncomparability of utilities necessarily follows. But in the
process of making their critique, the ordinalists shifted the
premises considerably and unnecessarily made the science of
economics a much less useful tool than it might otherwise have
been.89
2. Social Value in the Thought of Roscoe Pound
The legal scholar who benefited most directly from Edward
Ross's work on social value theory was Roscoe Pound. The two
men became friends at the University of Nebraska just after
the turn of the twentieth century, and by all accounts Ross was
the inspiration for Pound's vision of the melding of legal policy
and social science that Pound later called "sociological juris-
prudence."90 Pound's early writing relied on Ross as well as
other social scientists. He was concerned about outmoded legal
rules, using substantive due process, or liberty of contract, as
his principal example.91 He believed that although legal use of
the term "liberty of contract" was relatively recent, the indi-
vidualistic bias of liberty of contract doctrine actually origi-
nated with the classical political economists-mainly, Adam
Smith, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill. 92 Pound argued
that classical economics had given the law an individualistic
bias that ignored the social aspects of value inherent in the so-
cial sciences, particularly sociology. According to Pound's biog-
rapher, Pound was particularly influenced by Ross's Sin and
89. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 129-37.
90. See DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND 111-14 (1974). Pound needs a new
biography that is somewhat more critical, that explores more deeply the intellec-
tual origins of Pound's pre-1930s thought, and that evaluates more fully Pound's
1930s relationship with the Legal Realists.
91. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909)
[hereinafter Pound, Liberty of Contract]; Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurispru-
dence, 8 COLUi. L. REV. 605 (1908) [hereinafter Pound, Mechanical Jurispru-
dence].
92. See Pound, Liberty of Contract, supra note 91, at 455-56. Pound relied
for his critique of the classicists on HENRY ROGERS SEAGER, INTRODUCTION TO
ECONOMICS (3d ed. 1907), replaced in later years by his more influential
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1913). Seager was trained in the German Historical




Society,93 in which Ross argued that the country's numerous
moral dilemmas had social rather than individual roots. 94
For his ideas of social value, however, Pound placed little
obvious reliance on the English and American utilitarians or
marginalists. 95 Pound, as many other Progressive Era scien-
tists, drew much of his social value theory from the German
historical tradition.96 Pound was particularly indebted to
Rudolf von Jhering, a mid-nineteenth century German legal
historian who had attempted to modify extreme German his-
toricism by making its theory of change less metaphysical and
more Darwinian. 97 If one can judge from citations, Pound's "so-
ciological jurisprudence" owes much more to the German His-
torical School and the reaction against it than to the British
economic tradition.98
Nineteenth century German historical scholarship was
strongly nationalistic, institutionalist, and had little conception
of individual autonomy. One impact of Pound's German at-
tachment is that individual preference plays little role in his
social theory.99 "Social interests," insofar as Pound articulated
93. EDWARD ALSWORTH Ross, SIN AND SOCIETY (1907).
94. See WIGDOR, supra note 90, at 113.
95. Pound cited SEAGER, supra note 92, and the work of other Progressive
Era sociologists, including EDWARD A. ROSS, SOcIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1908), cited in
Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 91, at 607 n.7; LESTER FRANK
WARD, APPLIED SOCIOLOGY (1906), cited in Pound, Liberty of Contract, supra
note 91, at 454 n.3.
96. On the influence of the German Historical School on Progressive Era
American scholarship, see JURGEN HERBST, THE GERMAN HISTORICAL SCHOOL IN
AMERICAN SCHOLARSHIP (1965). On Pound and German historicism and the
German "free law" movement, which sought to identify "social interests" that the
law should protect, see James E. Herget & Stephen Wallace, The German Free
Law Movement as the Source of American Legal Realism, 73 VA. L. REV. 399, 422-
28 (1987). On the German historical school and legal thought generally, see id. at
405-06.
97. See, e.g., RUDOLF VON JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 332-33
(Isaac Husik trans., 1913). On Jhering's influence on Pound, see Herget &
Wallace, supra note 96, at 407-10; WIGDOR, supra note 90, at 114-18.
98. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Legislation as a Social Function, 18 AM. J. SOc.
755, 762 (1913); Roscoe Pound, Making Law and Finding Law, 82 CENTRAL L.J.
351, 358 (1916); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurispru-
dence (pts. 1-3), 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140 (1912), 25
HARV. L. REV. 490 (1912) [hereinafter Pound, Scope and Purpose]; Roscoe Pound,
Social Problems and the Courts, 18 AM. J. SOC. 331, 341 (1912).
99. However, later in his career Pound moved to the right and objected to
what he saw as Legal Realism's use of the social sciences to subordinate all con-
cern for the individual to various question about public goods and values. See
generally, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Public Law and Private Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 469
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them, were things to be discovered by social scientists, and
Pound had a rather technocratic view about social science
methodology. He seemed to think that sociologists and psy-
chologists simply knew what was best for people. Even his the-
ory of legislation has the ideal legislator largely ignoring the
choices of his constituency. Rather, the legislator's job is to do
the right thing, and the right thing is invariably dictated by so-
cial science inquiry. At the same time, Pound never paid much
attention to economics. 00 For him, the social sciences in "so-
ciological jurisprudence" were mainly the disciplines of sociol-
ogy, psychology, and political science. In sum, Pound's legal
theory was certainly one of the most non-individualistic theo-
ries to be developed by a high profile thinker associated with an
elite American legal institution.'0 ' His thought was fundamen-
tally inimical to neoclassical economic analysis, although it fit
in quite well with the institutional economics of the early dec-
ades of the twentieth century.
B. THE CRISIS OF MARGINALIST THEORY
An initial consequence of marginalism was the develop-
ment of a dialogue in which academic economists and legal
theorists saw themselves as engaged in a common intellectual
enterprise that included the other social sciences as well.
10 2
Progressives seized upon important conceptions that seemed
inherent in the new economics: its belief that markets often
work poorly, that wealth transfers could increase social wel-
fare, and that commodities have a social value that may be
more important for policy purposes than the values assigned by
the market.'0 3 Marginalism for a time seemed to turn econom-
ics into a Darwinian social science. This provided Progressive
intellectuals with an opportunity to link law and the social sci-
(1939).
100. Pound seems hostile toward economics as a general matter, and gener-
ally understood "economics" in legal analysis to refer to interest group politics.
See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Economic Interpretation and the Law of Torts, 53
HARV. L. REV. 365, 383 (1940) (identifring the "economic interpretation" as the
theory of how the rise and fall of various economically or politically powerful in-
terests explains changes in tort law, and then arguing that such analysis ac-
counts for only a small part of the law of torts).
101. See, e.g., Pound, Scope and Purpose (pt. 3), supra note 98, at 489, 516
(listing the characteristics of Sociological Jurisprudence).
102. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 18.




ences, including economics, creating a valuable set of tools for
state policy-making.
After the 1910s, economists became increasingly skeptical,
indifferent and eventually hostile toward concepts of social
value-or to any concept of value that could not be defined
strictly in terms of individual preference. For most neoclassical
economists the question was not whether individual utility
functions have social origins. Most either conceded that they
did or else had nothing to say about the matter. Rather, the
important issue was whether the study of the social origins of
preference ought to be a part of economics. Broadening the in-
quiry softened the scientific status of their discipline. The hard
mathematics of marginal utility economics applied to the con-
sequences of a set of preferences assumed as both given and
stable. For example, the developing models of competition and
welfare economics assumed a set of relatively durable individ-
ual preferences and then measured the consequence of transac-
tions that could be shown to occur anytime the prospective
buyer valued a good by more than the prospective seller. 1 4 By
contrast, study of the social sources of preference exposed eco-
nomics to far mushier, less tractable questions that main-
stream neoclassicists preferred be relegated to the other social
sciences. Essentially, economists were much more concerned
about distinguishing their methodology rather than unifying
their discipline with sociology, psychology or political science.
Sociologists and psychologists wanted just the opposite.
They tended to see inquiries into the source of preference as the
key to a unified scientific method. Edward Ross argued that
what one person is willing to pay for a commodity is driven in
large part by his perception of what others are willing to pay
for it.105 As a result, economists must become much more in-
volved in sociological questions about the nature and source of
preference. 0 6 John Dewey continued to argue as late as 1930
that social value was as important to economics as individual
value, and that studies of the relationship between the two
promised to unify psychology and economics. Dewey presaged
the theory of human capital by arguing that the economic con-
cept of marginal value was scientifically meaningful only if de-
104. See generally Stigler, supra note 62.
105. See generally Edward Ross, The Sociological Frontier of Economics, 13
Q.J. ECON. 386 (1898).
106. See id. at 394.
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fined as the capacity of a good to make a person a productive
member of society. 107
For the neoclassicists, marginalism's promised mathemati-
cal precision could be realized only if economics abandoned
both its evolutionary commitments and its search for social
conceptions of value. The mathematics of preference could deal
only with the assumptions that preferences were stated and
ranked. Adding information about where preferences came
from or how they related to productivity was not only irrele-
vant, but it made mathematical manipulation of utility func-
tions intractable. Thus, the utility curve of neoclassical welfare
economics began to rely on an unprecedented and extraordi-
narily narrow set of assumptions about what constitutes scien-
tific knowledge of welfare.
Legal theory generally followed sociology and psychology
rather than the economists. As a result, beginning in the
1930s, economic theory became marginalized within progres-
sive legal theory, and the economics used by elite legal theo-
rists moved increasingly to the periphery of economic theory
generally. By the 1930s and 1940s, the economics of legal the-
ory was thoroughly institutionalist, long after institutionalism
had fallen into disfavor in economic circles.108 By contrast,
"welfare" economics, whose concerns were often thought by
neoclassicists to lay at the boundaries of economics, became in-
creasingly neoclassical and hostile to the redistributive ele-
ments in the policy agenda of the progressive Legal Realists
and the New Deal. Neoclassical welfare economists generally
believed that any policy of state distribution could be justified
only by political considerations and value judgments, but not by
economic science.109
107. See JOHN DEWEY, INDIVIDUALISM, OLD AND NEW 9, 135, 168-71 (1930);
John Dewey, Theory of Valuation, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
UNIFIED SCIENCE 19-50 (1930). Compare the work of Clarence Ayres, a younger
Progressive who did not start writing until the 1940s but then became a promi-
nent dissenter from neoclassicism. Ayres also believed that one could measure
social value through productivity tests-for example, conducting experiments on
the importance of milk for infants and then coming up with a social value finc-
tion that would inform the state policymaker about how many resources should
be committed to guaranteeing its availability. See CLARENCE E. AYRES, THE
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY 305 (1952).
108. See infra notes 151-95 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., GUNNAR MYRDAL, THE POLITICAL ELEMENT IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOIC THEORY 102 (1953). See generally I.M.D. LITTLE,
CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS (1950); J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Wel-
fare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of
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1. The Critiques of Veblen and Schumpeter
This divorce of law and economics was facilitated by the
thought of two important outsiders to the neoclassical tradi-
tion, Thorstein Veblen"10 and Joseph Schumpeter."' Although
they viewed economics from vastly different perspectives, they
came to surprisingly similar and influential conclusions about
the relationship between economics and the social sciences.
The insight that Veblen and Schumpeter presented in such
radically different ways was that the neoclassical concept of the
marginal utility curve could refer only to the preferences of in-
dividuals. To speak of group preferences was meaningless. For
Veblen, this entailed that the concept of marginal utility itself
be reconstituted so that economics could become a more "evolu-
tionary" and social science. For Schumpeter, it entailed that
economics abandon its evolutionary concern with "social" val-
ues and stick to its orthodox business of measuring the choices
made by individuals. Eventually, economics followed Schumpe-
ter, while the law and other social sciences generally followed
Veblen. 112
a. Veblen: Evolution, Marginal Utility, and Institutions
Veblen was Progressive economics' most influential out-
sider. Not only was he an outsider to the numerous educa-
tional institutions with which he was briefly associated, he was
also an outsider to the theory. He wrote more as a critical,
transcendent observer than as a participant in any group en-
terprise. Reading him is frustrating. Although Veblen's best
prose is brilliant, his discursive style often makes the main
point hard to find.
Economics and Inter-personal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939).
110. On Veblen, see LEONARD DENTE, VEBLEN's THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE
(1977); JOSEPH DORFMAN, THORSTEIN VEBLEN AND HIS AMERICA (1934);
STEPHEN EDGELL, VEBLEN: SOCIAL THEORIST AND SOCIAL CRITIC (1987); JA.
HOBSON, VEBLEN (1937); DAVID RIESMAN, THORSTEIN VEBLEN (1953); DAVID
SECKLER, THORSTEIN VEBLEN AND THE INSTITUTIONALISTS (1975); BEN B.
SELIGMAN, MAIN CURRENTS IN MODERN ECONOMICS 129-58 (1962).
111. On Schumpeter, see RICHARD SWEDBERG, SCHUMPETER: A BIOGRAPHY
(1991).
112. See generally supra notes 110-11. Both Veblen and Schumpeter also
criticized the importance that neoclassicism assigned to the concept of an equilib-
rium. Both believed that the essence of markets and exertions of preference is




Veblen's conception of economics and markets was that
human beings act according to "habits" that account for all of
human behavior and whose characteristics are formed by evo-
lution. 13 Veblen used "habits" in roughly the same sense that
neoclassical welfare economists use "preferences." The impor-
tance of evolution was, first, that these habits were continually
changing; second, they were the product of a complex interac-
tion between the environment and the individual organism
seeking survival. 14 As a result, these habits differed insofar as
nature produced variation, but they were the same insofar as
the natural selection process chose certain classes of habits for
survival. Veblen, the father of American institutionalism, then
added that institutions were nothing more than those "settled
habits of thought common to the generality of men."115 In
common with Darwinism but hardly with neoclassical econom-
ics, Veblen believed that human "reasoning is largely controlled
by other than logical, intellectual forces; ... and the sentiment
which animates men, singly or collectively, is as much, or more,
an outcome of habit and native propensity as of calculated ma-
terial interest.' 16 Veblen found the neoclassical conception of
preferences to be fundamentally flawed because it made no in-
quiry into the evolutionary source of habits, but simply took
preferences as given." 7
Veblen thus rejected the entire neoclassical notion that
human beings are economic actors with a set of stable, gener-
113. See GEOFFREY MARTIN HODGSON, ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTION (1993);
Stephen Edgell, Thorstein Veblen's Theory of Evolutionary Change, 34 AM. J.
ECON. & Soc. 267 (1975).
114. See generally Charles G. Leathers, Veblen and Hayek on Instincts and
Evolution, 12 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 162 (1990).
115. Thorstein Veblen, The Limitations of Marginal Utility, 17 J. POL. ECON.
620, 626 (1909); see also Richard N. Langlois, What Was Wrong with the Old In-
stitutional Economics? (And What Is Still Wrong with the "New"?), 1 REV. POL.
ECON. 3 (1989).
116. Thorstein Veblen, The Socialist Economics of Karl Marx and His Follow-
ers, 21 Q.J. ECON. 299, 308 (1907).
117. See Veblen, supra note 115, at 627.
To any modem scientist interested in economic phenomena, the
chain of cause and effect in which any given phase of human culture
is involved, as well as the cumulative changes wrought in the fabric of
human conduct itself by the habitual activity of mankind, are matters
of more engrossing and more abiding interest than the method of in-
ference by which an individual is presumed invariably to balance




ally autonomous preferences who trade toward an equilib-
rium.118 He also rejected the view that the source of prefer-
ences is completely exogenous to the neoclassical system.
Rather, economics should study the habits that yield human
preferences, and the changes that occur in them, and not
merely seek to divine what the equilibrium condition would be
after settled individual preferences have been exercised in the
market.1 9 Equilibrium was rather unimportant to any general
theory of economics because the structure of human habit was
always the result of interaction of human variation and the en-
vironment, and continuously subject to evolutionary change. 120
This set of concerns characterizes Veblen's approach as "insti-
tutionalist" and serves to set him apart from the mainstream
neoclassicism which rejected institutionalism in the 1920s. 121
Veblen's Darwinism enabled him to speak of societies-or,
more specifically, of institutions-as economic participants.
Just as human individuals compete in a struggle for existence,
so too do the institutions that human beings form:
The evolution of social structure has been a process of natural selec-
tion of institutions. The progress which has been and is being made
in human institutions and in human character may be set down,
broadly, to a natural selection of the fittest habits of thought and to a
process of enforced adaptation of individuals to an environment which
has progressively changed with the growth of the community and
with the changing institutions under which men have lived. Institu-
tions are not only themselves the result of a selective and adaptive
process which shapes the prevailing or dominant types of spiritual at-
titude and aptitudes; they are at the same time special methods of life
and of human relations, and are therefore in their turn efficient fac-
tors of selection. So that the changing institutions in their turn make
for a further selection of individuals endowed with the fittest tem-
perament, and a further adaptation of individual temperament and
habits to the changing environment through the formation of new in-
stitutions. 11
118. See Thorstein Veblen, Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?,
12 Q.J. ECON. 373 (1898); see also Thorstein Veblen, The Preconceptions of Eco-
nomic Science (pt. 3), 14 Q.J. ECON. 240 (1900); Thorstein Veblen, Professor
Clark's Economies, 22 Q.J. ECON. 147 (1908).
119. On this point, see Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Thorstein Veblen and Post-
Darwinian Economies, 16 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 285, 292 (1992).
120. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, The Evolution of the Scientific Point of View, 10
UNIV. CAL. CHRON. (n.d.), reprinted in THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN
CIVILIZATION AND OTHER ESSAYS 32, 37 (Transaction Publishers 1990) (1919).
121. See infra notes 151-61 and accompanying text.
122. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 131 (Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1973) (1899); see also Malcolm Rutherford, Thorstein Veblen and the
Processes of Institutional Change, 16 HIST. POL. ECON. 331 (1984); Rick Tilman,
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b. Schumpeter: Methodological Individualism and the Attack
on Social Value
If individuals do not have precisely identical preferences,
and if the differences are not precisely knowable, then one can
apply the mathematics of marginalism only to individuals.
This observation, modest but revolutionary, appeared in one of
Joseph Schumpeter's early English contributions to economic
thought, written in Vienna long before he immigrated to the
United States. 2 3 As a result, Schumpeter argued, if economics
hopes to acquire anything approaching scientific precision of
statement it must adopt "methodological individualism" as a
working procedure. 2 4 Schumpeter then insisted that this move
would not require the economist to take any position on the
Some Recent Interpretations of Thorstein Veblen's Theory of Institutional Change,
21 J. ECON. ISSUES 683 (1987).
123. See generally Joseph A. Schumpeter, On the Concept of Social Value, 23Q.J. ECON. 213 (1909). A year earlier he had published DAS WESEN UND
HAUPTINHALT DER THEORETISCHEN NATIONALOKONOMIE (1908) [NATURE AND
ESSENCE OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS], which was never translated.
124. Schumpeter's writing was stark and to the point:
At the outset it is useful to emphasize the individualistic charac-
ter of the methods of pure theory. Almost every modern writer starts
with wants and their satisfaction, and takes utility more or less ex-
clusively as the basis of his analysis. Without expressing any opinion
about this modus procedendi, I wish to point out that, as far as it is
used, it unavoidably implies considering individuals as independent
units or agencies. For only individuals can feel wants.... [M]arginal
utilities do not depend on what society as such has, but on what indi-
vidual members have. Nobody values bread according to the quantity
of it which is to be found in his country or in the world, but everybody
measures the utility of it according to the amount that he has himself,
and this in turn depends on his general means.
Schumpeter, supra note 123, at 214.
On methodological individualism in economics, see MARK BLAUG, THE
METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS 129-56, 227-31 (1980); RANDALL G. HOLCOMBE,
ECONOMIC MODELS AND METHODOLOGY 57-69 (1989). On methodological in-
dividualism in law and economics, and its relation to interpersonal utility
comparisons, see generally Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42
DUKE L.J. 53 (1992). Methodological individualism in philosophy and the
other social sciences long antedates Schumpeter, although it was not much
debated during the Progressive Era. See generally Leon J. Goldstein, The In-
adequacy of the Principle of Methodological Individualism, 53 J. PHIL. 801
(1956); Steven Lukes, Methodological Individualism Reconsidered, 19 BRIT. J.
Soc. 119 (1968); Maurice Mandelbaum, Societal Facts, 6 BRIT. J. SOC. "305
(1955); Richard Miller, Methodological Individualism and Social Explanation,
45 PHIL. SCI. 387 (1978); J.W.N. Watkins, Historical Explanation in the Social
Sciences, 8 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 104 (1957); J.W.N. Watkins, Ideal Types and
Historial Explanation, 3 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 22 (1952).
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fundamental question whether values are in some sense "so-
cial" as well as individual.
Schumpeter's observation was of course true as a purely
technical matter. If we need to know the precise ratio in which
Smith will buy food and opera tickets, and if Smith's asserted
preferences are observed to differ from the preferences of oth-
ers, then precise quantification of Smith's choices will not accu-
rately describe the choices made by someone else. Further,
"[slociety as such, having no brain or nerves in a physical
sense, cannot feel wants and has not, therefore, utility curves
like those of individuals."125 Economic welfare must be deter-
mined by individual preferences. Outside of a communistic so-
ciety-by which he apparently meant a society having no mar-
kets at all-the concept of "social" value was meaningless.
In sharp distinction to Veblen, as well as other Progressive
Era economists, Schumpeter also concluded that no insights
useful for economics could be gleaned by examining the sources
of human preference and welfare. "For theory it is irrelevant
why people demand certain goods: the only important point is
that all things are demanded, produced, and paid for because
individuals want them." 26 This conclusion defined the differ-
ences between Veblen and Schumpeter, and also between Pro-
gressive and neoclassical policy science. Considered for its
value to economics, the study of human evolution was an in-
quiry into the source of human welfare and preference, and an
attempt to classify and weigh preferences by studying adapta-
tion and survival. Once neoclassicism took Schumpeter's sug-
gestion that inquiries into the source of preference were not a
part of economics, then it did not matter whether human be-
ings were the products of biological evolution or whether they
had been placed on this earth in a single instant with their
preferences fully formed and as unchangeable as the shapes of
their ears. Neoclassical economics after the 1930s assumed the
latter.
Schumpeter believed, as would nearly all neoclassical
economists a generation later, that economics could maintain
its scientific status only by confining its conclusions to what the
data showed, and the kind of data that economists used pro-
vided evidence only of fully formed individual preferences. 127
125. Schumpeter, supra note 123, at 215.
126. Id. at 216.
127. See generally Frank H. Knight, The Nature of Economic Science in Some
Recent Discussion, 24 AM. ECON. REv. 225 (1934).
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Within this model, the concept of "social value," as some kind of
amalgam of individual values, could never be more than a
vague "analogy." 2 8
Schumpeter's observation served to alienate economics
from the social sciences. The source of the division was that
Schumpeter's was not the only way of formulating the problem.
If the important question was the extent to which individual
preferences differed, then Schumpeter was right. But if the
question was whether the evolutionary process results in pref-
erences that are sufficiently similar that one can draw useful
generalizations about them, then social scientists in other dis-
ciplines believed they had plenty to offer, particularly to legal
policymakers obsessed with Pragmatism and useful knowledge.
Schumpeter's critique of the concept of social value, plus the
later ordinalist critique of welfare economics, also separated
the fundamental concerns of neoclassical economics from those
of the other social sciences.
2. Ordinalism and the Death of Progressive Welfare Econom-
ics
The combination of marginalism and Darwinism gave Pro-
gressive policymakers a rationale for the redistribution of
wealth. If money is subject to declining marginal utility, and if
all persons are basically alike in their environmental needs and
responses, then total welfare can be improved by transferring
wealth from those who have much to those who have little.
Neoclassical economists in the 1930s argued that this justi-
fication for wealth transfers was unscientific because it rested
on unverifiable assumptions; namely, that individual utility
functions are identical or nearly so, and that the amount of
utility that one individual receives from any unit of a good can
be quantified and compared with the amount another receives
from the same unit. Although we might know that A values
her millionth dollar by much less than her first dollar, A may
nevertheless value her millionth dollar by more than B values
his first dollar. In that case, a forced wealth transfer from mil-
lionaire A to pauper B would be counterproductive.129
128. See Schumpeter, supra note 123, at 220-22.
129. See ROBBINS, supra note 88, at 136-47. See generally Lionel Robbins, In-
terpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 48 ECON. J. 635 (1938). Schumpeter had al-
ready observed a generation before Robbins's essay:
A most interesting assumption would be that, at a given time and
in a given place, individual utility curves for each commodity do not
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Using exquisitely positivistic rhetoric, 130 Lionel Robbins
observed that if B claimed to receive more utility from this
dollar than A did, no one, including A or B, would be able to de-
velop a test that would verify or falsify B's claim. Within the
au currant jargon of logical positivism,' 31 this made the propo-
sition that B receives more utility from the marginal dollar
than A does meaningless; statements that can be neither veri-
fied nor falsified have no meaning whatsoever.
As far as neoclassical economics was concerned, Robbins's
analysis swept the field. 132 However, the novelty of Robbins's
observations should not be exaggerated. Some pre-ordinalist
and even pre-neoclassical economists knew full well that sub-
jective feelings could not be compared across persons. Even
Jeremy Bentham had lamented that it was "in vain to talk of
adding quantities which after the addition will continue dis-
tinct as they were before, one man's happiness will never be
another man's happiness: a gain to one man is no gain to an-
other; you might as well pretend to add 20 apples to 20
pears." 133 Nonetheless, Bentham concluded that although the
"addibility of the happiness of different subjects. . may appear
fictitious," it was a proposition "without the allowance of which
all political reasoning is at a stand."134 By 1940, mainstream
economists purported to abhor all interpersonal comparisons of
utility. To make them became one of economics' most conspicu-
ous indiscretions. Theoretical economics very largely aban-
doned the business of making policy proposals about the distri-
bution of wealth.
differ very much from each other. To-day (sic] we do not assume any-
thing of this sort, but fashion, imitation, etc., might support such an
hypothesis, the importance of which it is needless to emphasize.
Schumpeter, supra note 123, at 219 n.2.
130. On the influence of scientific positivism on neoclassicism in the 1930s,
see WILLIAM H. BEVERIDGE, THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND ITS
PROBLEMS, 1919-1937, at 46-58 (1960).
131. See, e.g., ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 5-16
(1936).
132. See, e.g., LITTLE, supra note 109, at 55-58. See generally R.F. Harrod,
Scope and Method of Economics, 48 ECON. J. 383 (1938); Hicks, supra note 109;
Kaldor, supra note 109.
133. Wesley C. Mitchell, Bentham's Felicific Calculus, 33 POL. SCI. Q. 161
(1918) (quoting a manuscript in 3 HALEVY, RADICALISME PHILOSOPHIQUE 431).
134. Id. Bentham argued that the problem of interpersonal utility compari-
sons was significant and made any "calculus" of interpersonal pain and pleasure
impossible, but that social science could probably proceed on the basis of some-
what less precise interpersonal utility comparisons.
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In the process, however, Robbins's ordinalism 135 completely
cut the knot between Darwinism and neoclassical economics.
The basis of Robbins's reasoning was that preferences were
both autonomous and unique, in that they were strictly non-
comparable from one person to another. Further, the only
thing one could know about a preference is that it reflected the
mental state of the person who asserted it. The logical conclu-
sion was that getting behind the preference to its source was
either unscientific, because such inquiries depended on suppo-
sitions that could not be tested, or else it was simply outside
the boundary of scientific economic inquiry.
The new neoclassicism also required economists to sepa-
rate the economic conception of "welfare" from the social sci-
ence conception. The only meaning "value" could have under
post-Robbins neoclassicism was observed individual willingness
to pay, and welfare was nothing more than the aggregate of in-
dividual valuation, which depended on nothing more than the
evaluator's state of mind. The economists' welfare became very
tightly connected to the competitive market, with the general
conclusions being (1) that perfect competition maximizes total
social welfare; (2) any governmental interference with the mar-
ket that is not justified by a market failure either reduces wel-
fare or else has indeterminate welfare consequences; and (3)
maldistribution of wealth is not a market failure. By contrast,
sociologists and psychologists continued to think of welfare in
terms of survival of the species; objective factors such as health,
nutrition, shelter, and education; or alternatively (for psycholo-
gists) some definition of a sense of well-being or ideas relating
well-being to behavior.' 36
One might think the ordinalists were entirely correct as a
technical matter, but that they nevertheless drew the wrong
implications for legal policy. If the legal policymaker's concep-
tion of welfare is limited to subjectively defined preference or-
derings that are good only for the individual asserting the pref-
erences, then the ordinalists were correct. To that end, the
135. The name "ordinalism" derives from the fact that one can still compare
utilities ordinally by observing exchange. For example, if we see A trade two ap-
ples for one of B's pears, Ave can still say that A receives less utility from one addi-
tional apple than from one additional pear, but we cannot put any unit (such as
inches or pounds) on this measure that we can assume applies equally to both A
and B. That is, cardinal measurement is impossible.
136. See, for example, the works by Watson, Pavlov, Weiss, Dewey, Bagley &
Colvin, McDougall, and Meyer cited in supra note 32.
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search for alternative routes to interpersonal utility compari-
sons seem doomed to failure.
But the Progressive conception of welfare was not defined
by subjectively asserted preference. As Darwinians, the Pro-
gressive social scientists believed that human beings were the
product of their own genetic background and environment, and
that the "welfare" needs they had in common dwarfed in sig-
nificance the variations in welfare needs that they perceived
individually. For the Progressives, the state was more like the
farmer raising crops or cattle. Cows are individuals and can
and do assert unique preferences; but the farmer either does
not take these preferences into account or else considers them
only at the margin (e.g., unusually aggressive, ravenous, ill, or
depressed cows might receive distinctive treatment). Over a
broad range of questions the farmer defines the welfare of cows
by using biological rather than economic tools. For example,
she considers the mixture of foods and other environmental
qualities that will prevent disease, reduce observed stress
and-most importantly-maximize production. 137
3. Methodological Individualism, Ordinalism, and the Fate of
Progressive Legal Thought
Methodological individualism and ordinalism carried two
implications for progressive legal thought after 1930. The first
was that economists (although not necessarily philosophers)
would generally assume as an essential point of methodology
that "utility" refers exclusively to mental states and that cardi-
nal orderings of utilities cannot be compared across persons.
Second, they would assume that utility information is the only
kind of information about welfare. To use welfare criteria un-
related to preference is to step outside the boundaries of eco-
nomic science.
Although much has been written about the first of these
constraints (noncomparability of utilities), the second con-
straint (i.e., only utility information counts) more explicitly de-
fines the emerging gap between neoclassical economics and the
thought of the Legal Realists. Progressive legal thinkers really
did not devote all that much time to the technical and logical
problems inherent in interpersonal utility comparisons.
Rather, they simply measured "welfare" by objective criteria
unrelated to utility. Increasingly, they relied on "objective"
137. This was fundamentally the analysis of WARD, supra note 30.
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welfare judgments that inferred utility from categorical obser-
vations about survival and productivity. In making such judg-
ments, Progressive legal thought found the social sciences
much more useful than economics, which purported to abhor
any welfare judgment not based on observed preference.
C. ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONALISM AND LEGAL REALISM
1. Welfare and the External Standard
The external standard refers to the law's insistence that
conduct be evaluated without regard to the intent or state of
mind of the individual actor, but rather, by considering what
the average, reasonable person would have done in equivalent
circumstances. The external standard was articulated in the
1870s and 1880s by Thomas M. Cooley writing in torts, 138 and
much more fully by Holmes in The Common Law. 139 Writing
mainly as a legal historian, Holmes described the external
standard as a device used by courts to add consistency and pre-
dictive power to the law. 140 The law can operate only in the
sphere of the senses, Holmes noted, and cannot see the hearts
or intent of the actors whose conduct it must evaluate.
Holmes's student Samuel Williston carried the point much fur-
ther into the law's technical apparatus. Williston's 1920 trea-
tise on contracts is an extended argument for applying external
criteria of evaluation rather than making legal outcomes turn
on questions of intent.141
138. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 688 (1879)
(addressing the place of motive in the law of torts); HORWITZ, supra note 25, at
137.
139. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881). On Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., and the external standard, see generally HORWITZ, supra
note 25, at 110-13, 135-41; DAVID ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN HOLMES: HIS
THEORY OF TORTS IN HISTORY 129-31 (1995); Cotter, supra note 3; Anne C. Dai-
ley, Holmes and the Romantic Mind, 48 DuKE L.J. 429,452-56 (1998); Thomas C.
Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989); William A.
Lundquist, Comment, Oliver Wendell Holmes and External Standards of Crimi-
nal and Tort Libility: Application of Theory on the Massachusetts Bench, 28
BUFF. L. REV. 607, 608-10 (1979).
140. See HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 110.
141. See generally SAMUEL WiLLISTON, 1 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920). In
1 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 20, Williston notes actual consent is not an element
of contract, but merely the "expression" of consent, and concludes:
The parol evidence rule which is of such far reaching importance
in determining the existence and meaning of contracts is based on the
assumption that where a written memorial of the transaction is made
its terms are conclusive. Such a rule is inconsistent with the view
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Holmes's development of the external standard occurred
during his 1870s participation in the Harvard Metaphysical
Club, whose dialogue influenced the American philosophy of
pragmatism.1 42 Charles Sanders Peirce, in particular, was ve-
hement about the scientific uselessness of talking about things
that cannot be observed.1 43 Perhaps Pragmatism's most lasting
contribution was the adoption of objective methodologies such
as instrumentalism by the post-Darwinian social sciences.144
External standards are surrogates. The external observer
cannot get into the head of the person being observed, so she
tries to find useful correlations between observed acts and as-
sumed states of mind. The all-important ingredient in the so-
cial science defense of the external standard is Darwinian evo-
lution: state of mind is as much a part of the evolutionary
process as any other animal function, and all are motivated by
the instinct for survival. Pragmatic instrumentalism, but par-
ticularly the work of Holmes, made the external standard cen-
tral to Progressive analysis of legal policy. Progressives meas-
ured not only human responses but also human welfare needs
externally. In this sense, the methodology of the external stan-
dard was inimical to the developing methodology of neoclassical
economics.
But the question of who is scientific and who is engaged in
speculation or "politics" is hardly answered by that observation.
The neoclassical economists, particularly after Robbins, 145 as-
sumed that the "real" measure of welfare had to be subjectively
perceived preference, and the impossibility of interpersonal
utility comparisons forever forbade the policymaker from com-
that the mental attitude or assent of the parties is the ultimate ju-
ridical fact to be established.
Williston then concluded that the intent to contract was not a part of the law of
contract, see id. § 21; that legal consideration cannot be determined by the intent
of the parties, see id. §§ 101, 104; and that the statute of frauds must be broadly
construed, see id. §§ 448-84, 525-38.
142. See 2 ELIZABETH FLOWER & MURRAY G. MURPHY, 'A HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA chs. 10-15 (1977).
143. See generally 5 CHARLES S. PEIRCE, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 358 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1934,
1935) (reprinting CHARLES S. PEIRCE, THE FIXATION OF BELIEF (1877)); id. at 388
(reprinting CHARLES PEIRCE, How To MAKE OUR IDEAS CLEAR (1878)).
144. See ROSS, supra note 24, at 252-53, 327-30, 405-07. Good recent writing
includes Dailey, supra note 139, and Chad McCracken, Note, Hegel and the
Autonomy of Contract Law, 77 TEX. L. REV. 719 (1999).
145. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 84:805
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT WELFARE
paring the strengths of subjectively perceived preferences as
between two people.
By contrast, American Pragmatism was much more catho-
lic-indeed, its central tenet is that no form of knowledge is
"privileged" in that it claims a priori superiority over alterna-
tive forms. 146 If the study of individual assertions of preference
provides knowledge that is useful for some purpose, then such a
study should be deemed scientific and worth pursuing. But one
can say the same thing about the study of blood pressure, bio-
logical longevity, productivity, or any alternative conception of
welfare. If any form of knowledge is privileged, it is "useful"
rather than useless knowledge. That is, Pragmatism contained
a built-in bias for applied rather than pure science that legal
policy naturally found attractive. After the ordinalist revolu-
tion, neoclassical welfare economics turned heavily toward
theoretical concerns, and most of these appeared to be of only
minimal interest to Progressive legal policymakers.
The Pragmatist/social science approach to welfare was also
far more congenial to the basic republicanism of Progressive le-
gal thought than was the neoclassical conception of welfare as
preference. The principal difference between the classical and
republican traditions in American political thought is that the
classical tradition believes that social policy must be formed out
of the aggregation of individual preferences-i.e., by a social
contract, or the consent of the governed. The branch of neo-
classical economics we call public choice, or social choice, rests
on this proposition. Republicanism, by contrast, believed that
government officials should be appointed to represent others;
but from that point their obligation was not either to vote their
own individual preferences or their conception of the prefer-
ences of the group. Rather, it was to make policy judgments
about what was best for society, and these judgments might of-
ten conflict with the solutions dictated by markets or opinion
polls.
Today we have highly technical conceptions about the place
of the social contract in political theory. For example, Arrow's
general possibility theorem shows that non-unanimous deci-
sion-making in a social system where each participant receives
one vote cannot produce stable welfare policies. 147 Arrow's
theorem has two implications: either the decisions have to be
146. See generally, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY (1929).
147. See ARROW, supra note 2, at 59-73.
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unanimous in order to be said to be the choice of the gov-
erned 148 or else government agency identification of the optimal
policy must be made by some other means than the aggregation
of individual preferences.149
The most important differences between contractarians
and republicans pertain to their attitude toward government.
For the contractarian, markets are unambiguously the pre-
ferred way to allocate resources (when the social contract is ne-
gotiated, markets receive unanimous consent), and the gov-
ernment intervenes only in the extraordinary case where
everyone agrees that intervention is in order. As a result, pro-
vision of public goods such as national defense is presumed to
be permissible' 50 but forced wealth transfers generally are not,
because the involuntary transferors under such legislation
never would have consented to it. By contrast, republicans be-
lieve that government policies should be based on objective wel-
fare judgments about human needs. The Progressive concep-
tion of law as a social control device, together with their
general distrust of markets, generally drove them away from
the social contract and toward republican alternatives.
2. The Fate of Economic Institutionalism
Institutionalism in economic thought is as difficult to de-
fine as its near twin, Legal Realism, is in legal thought. 151 The
institutionalists were a diverse group of thinkers who disagreed
about many things. Indeed, perhaps the only proposition they
agreed about is the negative one that there are serious concep-
tual problems with neoclassical economics. Institutionalism
was popular during the first two decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, thanks largely to the writing of Progressives such as Ve-
blen, Ely, Commons, Seligman, Hale, and Wesley Mitchell in
the United States, and John A. Hobson in England. In the
148. As in JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMiTs OF LIBERT: BETWEEN
ANARcHY AND LEVIATHAN 35-52 (1975).
149. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 86.
150. But see Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 293, 333-36 (1992) (stating that even proposals respecting public
goods are subject to Arrovian cycling and failure of equilibrium).
151. In addition to the work of Veblen, Commons, Seligman, and Mitchell
cited previously, see Charles H. Cooley, The Institutional Character of Pecuniary
Valuation, 18 AM. J. SOC. 543, 546-50 (1913); Morris A. Copeland, Economic The-
ory and the Natural Science Point of View, 21 AM. ECON. REV. 67, 68 (1931);




1920s, institutionalism began to become marginalized within
economics and by the 1930s institutionalists were virtual per-
sonae non grata within orthodox economic circles, including the
American Economic Association, which was founded as a Pro-
gressive alternative to traditionalism but turned quickly to the
right.152
Intellectual historians in the Progressive tradition have
always been drawn to institutionalism. As a result, the institu-
tionalist movement tends to occupy a position in the intellec-
tual histories of the period that is out of proportion to its influ-
ence on economics itself. For example, Veblen's work is often
given lengthy treatment, while the much more technical and
influential work of John Bates Clark or Irving Fisher is ignored
or given only brief mention. 153 The marginalist revolution
working its way out in economics departments in the first three
decades of the twentieth century was certainly as interesting
and proved to be far more durable within economics than any-
thing institutionalism offered; however, it was also more tech-
nical, and the writing was addressed to other professional
economists rather than a broad range of policymakers. The re-
sult was that intellectual historians ignored it until relatively
recently.154
At the risk of oversimplification, the institutionalists were
evolutionists who believed that the study of economics could
not be divorced from such questions as the social and biological
origins of human preference and welfare. The institutionalists
also had much less faith than neoclassicists did in conventional
markets, and they believed that "institutions," rather broadly
defined, acted as market substitutes. Institutions are groups of
individuals that collectively form rules for allocating resources,
152. See A.W. Coats, The First Two Decades of the American Economic Asso-
ciation, 50 AM. ECON. REV. 555 (1960); Richard T. Ely, The Founding and Early
History of the American Economic Association, 26 Ali. ECON. REV. 141 (Supp.
1936).
153. See generally HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND 227-46
(1950) (containing lengthy discussion of Veblen while John Bates Clark, who is
mentioned once, is incorrectly lumped with the "classical economists"); RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955) (containing three mentions of Veblen;
none of Clark); MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT
AGAINST FORMALISM (1947) (containing numerous references to Veblen; none to
Clark or Fisher).
154. Recent examples taking marginalism into account are BARBARA H.
FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE
FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998); ROSS, supra note 24; Hovenk-
amp, supra note 21.
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and these rules might be quite different from those dictated by
the market. One institution is the market itself, but corpora-
tions, families, churches, political parties, the judicial system,
and clubs are all institutions. Institutionalism was heavily in-
fluenced by Edward Ross's conception of "social control," which
saw a wide variety of social institutions as control devices
regulating human behavior. 155 For John Commons, perhaps
the most formal of the institutionalists, allocation decisions
within the institution are a product of "working rules" and
"transactions."156 A working rule is a rule that the institution
uses for deciding how an allocation decision should be made
(e.g., "father knows best," or, one vote for each outstanding
share of common stock). A transaction then refers to a par-
ticular decision to allocate a resource in a particular way.
Finally, institutionalists believed that each of society's
various institutions was unique, and that the working rules of
each were proper subjects for economic study. This naturally
demanded a great deal of empirical work, and the domain over
which this research applied was quite limited. For example,
one might do empirical studies of how and why business corpo-
rations make decisions by observing their working rules and
the resulting transactions. Or one might do the same thing for
families, the judicial system, or municipal government. But the
generalizations that one might develop for individuals or tradi-
tional markets would not necessarily apply to corporations,
families, local governments, or any other institution, and even
those that applied to one business firm structure might not ap-
ply to another.
To give just one well-known example, institutionalists em-
phasized that an important characteristic of the modem busi-
ness corporation was the separation of ownership and control-
the fact that shareholders were absentee and managers repre-
sented only a small part of the ownership interest. 157 This
separation was thought to imply that the business corporation
was either less efficient or more dangerous than smaller pro-
155. See ROSS, supra note 30.
156. See JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 67-68, 121
(1924).
157. See generally ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); ROBERT S. BROOKINGS,
INDUSTRIAL OWNERSHIP: ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE (1925);
THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN
RECENT TIMES: THE CASE OF AMERICA (1923).
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prietorships. 158 More generally, corporations are not rational
maximizers in the same way that individuals are, and thus a
different set of market rules must be applied to them.
Neoclassicists either disputed such conclusions, minimized
their significance, or ignored them, believing that the study of
economic transactions was a study of markets, and that the
various forms that an economic actor might take provoked only
modest deviation from the neoclassical model of exchange.
Generalization and abstraction were the essence of neoclassi-
cism. Indeed, institutionalism's inability to devise testable,
general hypotheses explains why it failed to capture the minds
of the young economists of the 1930s and later. Institutional-
ists were always doing elaborate empirical studies about single
firms, industries or other institutions, but all of the conclusions
seemed quite descriptive and idiosyncratic, with no unifying
theory to hold them together. Empirical studies by the Legal
Realists tended to meet the same fate.159 Within the main-
stream of economics institutionalism died in the late 1920s and
early 1930s. 160 The debates in the AEA's American Economic
Review became much more notable for attacks on institution-
alism than for the institutionalist contributions themselves.' 61
158. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 157.
159. See infra text accompanying notes 173-74.
160. For a general treatment of institutional economics in the United States,
see HEATH PEARSON, ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE EcONOMISTS' NEW
SCIENCE OF LAW, 1830-1930 (1997); James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassi-
cal Economics: Science, Politics, and the Reconfiguration of American Tort Law
Theory, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 275 (1997); James J. Heckman, The Intellectual
Roots of the Law and Economics Movement, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 327 (1997); Ho-
venkamp, supra note 18; Herbert Hovenkamp, Law and Economics in the United
States: A Brief Historical Survey, 19 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 331 (1995). See also
the interesting panel discussion in Douglas G. Baird, The Future of Law and
Economics: Looking Forward, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1997).
161. See, e.g., Paul T. Homan, An Appraisal of Institutional Economics, 22
AM. ECON. REV. 10, 10-17 (1932); Institutional Economics, 22 AM. ECON. REV.
105-16 (Supp. 1932) (panel discussion).
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3. Institutionalism and Legal Realism 162
Legal Realism is notable for its numerous interdisciplinary
outreaches in psychology, sociology, anthropology, and political
science. But Legal Realism never reached the same accommo-
dation with economics. First, Legal Realists generally found
the other social sciences more useful than economics for the
analysis of legal rules. Second, the economics that they turned
to was decidedly out of favor among economists themselves.
The Legal Realists were incurable institutionalists, in both law
and economics. Scattered among the amateur and a few pro-
fessional social scientists who considered themselves to be Le-
gal Realists were a few economists. By and large, however,
they stood outside or at the margins of the neoclassical eco-
nomic tradition. For example, just as Karl Llewellyn was un-
derscoring the Legal Realist belief that legal conceptions should
be cut up into smaller pieces for purposes of analysis, 163 neo-
classical economists were rejecting market-specific institutional
approaches and trying to develop generalized theories that
would explain all parts of the economy.
To be sure, the Legal Realists were an extraordinarily di-
verse group of thinkers, and generalizing about them is diffi-
cult. But they generally shared Roscoe Pound's belief that legal
study should focus on the institutions that make and adminis-
ter the law. 164 Indeed, on this score they were deeply indebted
162. On Legal Realism, see HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 169-92. See generally
GARY JAN AIcHELE, LEGAL REALISM AND TWENTIETH-CENTURy AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE: THE CHANGING CONSENSUS (1990); G. Edward White, From
Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early
Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972). A particularly good
analysis of legal realism's basic analytic approach, less cluttered by au currant
ideology than many others, is Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a
Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267 (1997). On the Legal Realists'
empirical work in the social sciences, see JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995). On the institutional na-
ture of the Legal Realists' economics, see Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social
Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in
Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325 (1995); Oliver E. Williamson, Revisiting Legal Real-
ism: The Law, Economics, and Organization Perspective (1996) (unpublished pa-
per, in conjunction with University of California Berkeley, Program in Law and
Economics Working Paper) (on file with author).
163. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to
Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1237 (1931). Llewellyn was responding to
Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931).
164. On the indebtedness of the Legal Realists (particularly Llewellyn) to
Pound, and the stormy relations that developed later, see generally HORWITZ, su-
pra note 25, at 169-92; N.E.H. Hull, Reconstructing the Origins of Realistic Juris-
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to Pound, who had practically turned the study of law into a
study of legal institutions. Whether they spoke of sociology and
social control, 165 anthropology, 166 Freud and the fact-finding
power of courts, 167 anti-conceptualism, 68 limitations on the le-
gal process, 169 the role of the contract in modern society, 170 or
the coercive power of the laissez fare state,171 the one thing the
Legal Realists shared was an abhorrence of abstractions, par-
ticularly powerful traditional abstractions such as the "market"
played in classical and neoclassical economics.
Although Legal Realists talked much about law and the so-
cial sciences, Legal Realism was hardly a law and economics
movement.1 72 Indeed, Legal Realists taught law and every so-
prudence: A Prequel to the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange Over Legal Realism, 1989
DUKE L.J. 1302; N.E.H. Hull, Some Realism about the Llewellyn-Pound Ex-
change Over Realism: The Newly Uncovered Private Correspondence, 1927-1931,
1987 Wis. L. REv. 921.
165. See generally Thurman W. Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at So-
cial Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. 1 (1932); Underhill Moore & Theodore S. Hope, Jr.,
An Institutional Approach to the Law of Commercial Banking, 38 YALE L.J. 703
(1929); Underhill Moore & Charles Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study
in Legal Control, 53 YALE L.J. 1 (1943).
166. See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE
CHEYENNE WAY (1941); Huntington Cairns, Law and Anthropology, 31 COLUM.
L. REV. 32 (1931).
167. See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
168. See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next
Step, 30 COLM. L. REV. 431 (1930).
169. See generally FRANK, supra note 167; Charles E. Clark, Fact Research in
Law Administration, 2 CONN. B.J. 211 (1928); John Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their
Function in the Process of Decision, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (1931); William 0.
Douglas & J. Howard Marshall, A Factual Study of Bankruptcy Administration
and Some Suggestions, 32 COLUIM. L. REV. 25 (1932).
170. See generally, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in
Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931).
171. See generally, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Sup-
posedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923).
172. Morton Horwitz's conclusion that Legal Realists "pursued their attack on
the legitimacy of the market with a degree of insight, brilliance, and social pas-
sion that has never been equaled since" certainly captures their basic attitude
towards classical political economy, but it misstates their focus. See HORWITZ,
supra note 25, at 195. This may be a projection of the Critical Legal Studies
scholarship onto the Realists, but in any event, Horwitz discusses only Hale and
Dawson, neither of whom were among the most prominent Legal Realists. Fur-
ther, Hale's influential essay, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
Coercive State, 38 POL. SC. Q. 470 (1923), is not so much an attack on the legiti-
macy of the market as it is a call for a new understanding of the market that was
more sensitive to its coercive features. For example, he chastised the orthodox
defense of "liberty of contract" because it contrasted the supposed liberty of the
market against the coercion of state interference. See id. In fact, Hale argued,
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cial science but largely excluded neoclassical economics from
their teachings. 173 Although they touted the social sciences, the
brand of social science that the Legal Realists practiced was
more empirical than positive and more statistical than theo-
retical. They did this even in commercial areas that expressly
invoked the market, and where the influence of traditional eco-
nomics seemed obvious. 174
Institutionalist economics fit very well into this framework,
while the much more abstract and theoretical neoclassicism did
not. Even Robert L. Hale, who wrote mainly about law and
economics but is often grouped today with the Legal Realists, 175
is no exception. Hale, a trained economist who had a joint ap-
pointment in law and economics at Columbia, wrote mainly in
the field of price-regulated industries. He dedicated his career
to illustrating imperfections in the market that might justify
non-market intervention. He was a thoroughgoing institution-
the relevant choice was between two types of coercion, market coercion or coer-
cion by government decision. See, e.g., id. at 470 (contending laissez faire systems
themselves are "permeated with coercive restrictions of individual freedom" and
the restrictions are inconsistent with equal opportunity or preservation of the
rights of others). This new understanding was generally consistent with the view
of neoclassical economists that the classicists had exaggerated the degree of free-
dom that markets permitted. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 226-30 (labor);
id. at 268-95 (competition and antitrust). But see Richard Epstein, The Assault
That Failed: The Progressive Critique of Laissez Faire, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1697
(1999); Richard A. Epstein, Life Boats, Desert Islands, and the Poverty of Modern
Jurisprudence, 68 MISS. L.J. 861 (1999).
173. See LAURA KAIMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 153-54
(1986) (describing Yale curriculum in the 1940s). See generally John Henry
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale
Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459 (1979).
174. See generally, e.g., Underhill Moore & Theodore S. Hope, Jr., An Institu-
tional Approach to the Law of Commercial Banking, 38 YALE L.J. 703 (1929)
(taking a Commons-like approach in grouping organizations by the nature of the
transactions they make); Underhill Moore & Gilbert Sussman, Legal and Institu-
tional Methods Applied to the Debiting of Direct Discounts-Ill. The Connecticut
Studies, 40 YALE L.J. 752 (1931). For other articles in the Legal and Institutional
Methods Applied to the Debiting of Direct Discounts series by Moore and Suss-
man, see 40 YALE L.J. 381, 555, 752, 928, 1055, 1219 (1931). For an accounting of
Moore's research methodology, see John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism
and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFF. L.
REV. 195, 244-250 (1980); see also William Clark et al., The Business Failures
Project-A Problem in Methodology, 39 YALE L.J. 1013 (1930) (discussing a study
of bankruptcy administration); William 0. Douglas, A Functional Approach to the
Law of Business Associations, 23 ILL. L. REV. 673 (1929); Douglas & Marshall,
supra note 169 (discussing the process and flaws of a scientific study of the causes
of bankruptcy).
175. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 154, at 10-15.
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alist, and should be compared more with Veblen or Commons
than with Llewellyn or Frank. 76
Writing in the American Economic Review in 1919 and
1925, Legal Realists Walton Hamilton and Karl Llewellyn both
tried to defend jurisprudential use of institutionalist economics
to an audience of economists. Hamilton objected to the exces-
sive abstraction in neoclassical economic theory, and argued
that only an institutional approach to economics was suffi-
ciently comprehensive to account for the workings of markets,
government, and the full range of social phenomena that people
encountered in their lives.' 77 After all, political institutions af-
fect markets all the time. 7 8 He also argued that the neoclassi-
cal urge to make economics more scientific by separating it
from any political agenda was wrong-headed. Classical politi-
cal economists always had expressly political agendas, and
much classical writing had been intended as political tracts
rather than contributions to pure theory. 79 Together with the
social value theorists, 180 Hamilton also argued that economics
needed to be grounded in a more acceptable theory of human
behavior, which considered the source of preference rather than
just the preferences themselves.' 81
But Hamilton was preaching to the wrong audience. He
was correct that the classicists had always written with policy
concerns in mind. But neoclassicism, particularly since Alfred
Marshall, 8 2 had been fairly obsessed with turning economics
into a science, thus distinguishing the "economics" of the twen-
tieth century from the "political economy" of the nineteenth.
Marginalism promised to substitute mathematics for policy as
the underlying unifier of economic theory. Hamilton's paper
was met with a volley of criticism from economists. Lewis H.
176. See generally Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943); Hale, supra note 172; Robert L. Hale, Value to the
Taker in Condemnation Cases, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1931). For further discus-
sion about Hale, see FRIED, supra note 154; Neil Duxbury, Robert Hale and the
Economy of Legal Force, 53 MOD. L. REV. 421 (1990); Warren J. Samuels, The
Economy as a System of Power and Its Legal Bases: The Legal Economics of Rob-
ert Lee Hale, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 261 (1973); Schlegel, supra note 174, at 209 &
n.70.
177. See generally Walton H. Hamilton, The Institutional Approach to Eco-
nomic Theory, 9 AM. ECON. REV. 309 (Supp. 1919).
178. See id. at 314-15.
179. See id. at 312-13.
180. See supra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
181. See Hamilton, supra note 177, at 316-17.
182. See generally MARSHALL, supra note 40.
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Haney thought Hamilton's institutionalism was nothing more
than a throwback to the historical economics of the late nine-
teenth century, which contained no theory whatsoever and was
concerned mainly with giving full factual accountings of the in-
stitutions it observed, and making policy recommendations to
the state. 8 3 He believed that "Professor Hamilton will not be
able to develop any laws or build a science, but that his pro-
posal will merely lead to an ever changing description of an
ever changing environment."184 Haney then suggested that
economics was not like the other social sciences:
No one will deny that the various social sciences are closely inter-
related; but many will hold that it is a wise division of labor that the
economist should confine his attention to economic motives and eco-
nomic values. There are different levels of valuation, so to speak-
ethical, political, religious, aesthetic, and economic. There is ample
room for a distinct and separate science of economics to deal with this
last class of values.
185
Six years later, Karl Llewellyn offered the economists a
quite different defense of institutionalism. Law itself is a
costly, scarce resource, Llewellyn argued. 186 As a result, eco-
nomic decisions continually must be made concerning how the
resources given to law are to be allocated. "As governmental
energy is put to blocking robbery, it is drawn off of prohibition.
As the motor car gives criminals power to strike and get away,
the output of energy needed to block robbery increases."1 87 The
value of economic institutionalism for law is that it puts eco-
nomics to the task of informing policymakers about how scarce
resources should best be allocated. Llewellyn suggested that
areas deserving economic study were the use of form contracts
to reduce the overall costs of numerous similar transactions, 188
the use of administrative agencies and rule-making as less
costly substitutes for the legislative process, 189 and the use of
arbitration as a less costly alternative to litigation. 190




186. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions Upon Economics,
15 AMER. EcON. REV. 665, 666 (1925).
187. Id. at 668.
188. See id. at 673-75. Llewellyn concluded that in the one area that he had
studied, motion picture distribution contracts, standardized forms had been very
successful in reducing legal costs. See id. at 674.
189. See id. at 671-72.
190. See id. at 674-76.
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If Walton Hamilton's institutionalism was a throwback to
the work of Veblen, Llewellyn's idea that economists should
study the costs of the legal system was many years ahead of its
time, anticipating the more Coasian institutionalism of a later
generation. 191 The legal system allocates resources by means of
costly devices, and markets, corporations, families and other
institutions operate as alternatives. A worthy subject of eco-
nomic study is the comparative costs of these alternatives, as
well as the possible mechanisms that can reduce or eliminate
various transaction costs. Within this framework, an institu-
tion is an organization that behaves as a single economic actor
to the extent that such behavior enriches the members more
than does the use of a market. This conception of the institu-
tion, which began with the premise of maximizing, rational ac-
tors, promised to reunite institutionalism with neoclassical or-
thodoxy.
Llewellyn did not use the term "transaction costs," and he
did not have Coase's perspective on the irrelevance of the legal
system under an efficient bargaining regime. But he did offer
the one "institutional" perspective on economics and the legal
system that could have permitted law and economics to survive
into the 1930s: namely, that economists should devote their
methodologies to assessing the costs and benefits of various
procedural and substantive aspects of the legal system. He
then recommend where legal policy might be improved.
192
In the final analysis, the work of the Legal Realists in the
1930s was no more economic than Pound's work in the first two
decades of the twentieth century. Further, although the Legal
Realists were enamored of the social scientists, they generally
remained empiricists while economists and even social scien-
tists themselves were developing more positivistic methodolo-
gies. The Legal Realists who engaged in social science research
were generally obsessed with facts, constantly overwhelmed by
their variety and number,' 93 and found it difficult to do much
with theory. The theory, when it came, was generally about le-
191. For a discussion of Coasian institutionalism, see generally R.H. COASE,
THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUcTURE OF PRODUCTION 9 (1991); Ronald H. Coase, The
New Institutional Economics, 27 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 229
(1984). However, the origins can be found in R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm,
4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); see also Oliver E. Williamson, Kenneth Arrow and the
New Institutional Economics, in ARROW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE THEORY
OF ECONOMIC POLICY 584,585, 592 (Geo. R. Feiwel ed., 1987).
192. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
193. See generally, e.g., FRANK, supra note 167.
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gal process rather than legal substance. 94 Further, the love af-
fair with the social sciences eventually wore off. In the late
1940s, Jerome Frank lamented that the social sciences were
not "science" at all. They produced no laws or rules in the sci-
entific sense, but only mountains of incoherent data. Further,
economics was the worst of the lot: it not only produced moun-
tains of meaningless data, but it then used the data on the as-
sumption that human preferences and behavior would remain
constant, when in fact everyone knew that customs and prefer-
ences are continually evolving. 9 5
V. CONCLUSION: THE SPLINTERING OF THE
PROGRESSIVE COALITION AND THE REHABILITATION
OF THE MARKET
Legal Realism was one of progressive legal thought's most
important legacies. The New Deal was another, and the con-
tinuing, dramatic growth of government during and after the
Second World War was yet another. During this period elite
legal, political and historical thought was dominated by the
Progressive critique, which was republican in its idea of gov-
ernment, disdainful of private markets, expansive in its ideas
about the domain and efficacy of government regulation, and
much more concerned with equality than with efficiency. In le-
gal thought, economics took a back seat to the social sciences.
Indeed, even in areas such as antitrust, where one would ex-
pect traditional economic concerns to dominate, the articulated
concern became one of leveling the playing field as between big
and little firms, even at the expense of substantial production
inefficiencies and higher consumer prices.19 6
194. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Esk-
ridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (prepared from 1958 tentative edition).
This work was heavily influenced by Legal Realism and consumed by the institu-
tionalist approach to law. In this regard, the Legal Realists were indebted to
Pound, who also wrote more about legal institutions and legal process than about
substantive law. See generally, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Courts and Legislation, 7 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 361 (1915); Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law (pts. 1-3), 13
COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1913), 14 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 103 (1914); supra notes 91, 98-
100, 163. On the Legal Realists increasing concern with procedure, see Schlegel,
supra note 173, at 495-519. On Hart and Sacks, see ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL
POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 129-78, 315-17 (1998).
195. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN
JUSTICE 209, 210 & n.62 (1949).
196. See, for example, the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments to the anti-
merger statute, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994); see also H.R. REP. No. 81-1191, at 2-3
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The Great Society and welfare and civil rights expansion of
the 1960s thus mark the end rather than the beginning of an
era. Intellectually, Progressive legal policy had already run out
of gas. A new regime turned the study of government back to
the premises of individual preference and the social contract, 197
and then turned the study of legal conflict to private bargaining
under generally neoclassical conditions.198
Why did the Progressive ideal last as long as it did, and
why did it finally fall apart? Unlike the welfare liberalism of
the Democratic Party since the 1960s, Progressive legal
thought was dominated by a single agenda item: maldistribu-
tion of wealth and the resulting inequities and suffering. Both
the Progressive coalition of the turn of the century and the New
Deal coalition of the 1930s and 1940s were relatively cohesive
politically because their principal political concerns were eco-
nomic and were generally addressed to the wage earner, the
unemployed, the underemployed poor, or the elderly poor. In a
system where each person gets one vote and wealth is badly
distributed those earning less than the median can form a pow-
erful political coalition.
The Progressive coalition, just as many others, became a
victim of its own success. The economic failures of the Depres-
sion and the costs of the War gave way to the relative comfort
and security of the 1950s. The Progressive concern began to
shift away from wealth and toward other indicia of lack of
privilege, such as race, extremist political or social views, indi-
gent criminal defendants, alienage, and eventually gender, af-
fectional preference and disabilities. Although Brown v. Board
of Education and the Civil Rights movement were essential
steps to fairness, they came at a price: the new Progressive
concerns tended to divide rather than unite the coalition that
had supported it. Since the 1960s politically active Democratic
Party liberals have increasingly played the game of recognizing
new groups as disadvantaged while losing or risking the alle-
(1949) (discussing goals of merger policy as protecting smaller firms from larger,
lower cost rivals). The new merger policy, designed to prevent small high cost
firms from being "gobbled up" by larger, more efficient firms was hailed as a tri-
umph of law and economics. Cf Derek Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the
Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 226-31, 23848 (1960);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Derek Bok and the Merger of Law and Economics, 21 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 515, 521-22 (1988).
197. See generally ARROW, supra note 2; BUCHANAN & TULLOcK, supra note
15.
198. See generally Coase, supra note 11.
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giance of others. At its best, the democratic coalition has been
barely held together by its fear of the political alternative. At
its worst, it has been a set of bickering groups struggling for
recognition as disadvantaged so that its members can also be-
come the beneficiaries of government largesse. Meanwhile,
government entitlement programs began to move up the social
scale until their principal beneficiaries became, not the poor
and unemployed, but the employed and successful middle
class.199
The Progressives left a powerful legacy in their theory of
welfare. Their use of objective welfare judgments serves to re-
mind us that technical methodologies in the social sciences are
used for a purpose, that they rarely lack alternatives, and that
the search for methodological elegance and sophistication
should never trump the search for answers. Neoclassical wel-
fare economics under the ordinalists became so lashed to the
mathematical complexities and constraints of its conception of
welfare that it lost the ability to consider whether the concep-
tion was correct or-more relevantly-whether it was useful for
the purpose at hand.
199. See generally GORDON TULLOCK, ECONOMICS OF INCOME
REDISTRIBUTION, 111-50 (1983); GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL
PRIVILEGE AND RENT SEEKING (1989).
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